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A.  Introduction 
 
Positions in the business and financial sectors have commanded exceptionally high 
earnings in recent years and attracted extraordinary talent.
1  Professionals in these sectors often 
have a master’s in business administration (MBA) and the degree has grown in popularity among 
graduates of the best universities and colleges.  Among individuals with a BA from a selective 
institution, those earning an MBA within ten years of graduation increased from 4.3 percent for 
those finishing college in the early 1970s to 7.1 percent in the early 1990s.
2  During the same 
period, the share of MBAs among the graduates of selective undergraduate institutions earned by 
females increased by more than a factor of three.
3   The fraction female among all MBAs 
increased from 1970 to 2006 by a factor of ten, rising from 4 percent to 43 percent.
4 
 
Despite the narrowing of the gender gap in business education, there is a growing sense 
that women are not getting ahead fast enough in the corporate and financial world.  Bertrand and 
Hallock (2001) document the under-representation of women among the five highest paid 
executives in Execucomp’s (S&P 1500) firms from 1992 to 1997.  Only about 2.5 percent of the 
executives in their sample are women, and the under-representation is especially severe at the 
                                                 
1 Among men who received their BAs from Harvard University around 1970, 5 percent had positions in 
the financial sector 15 years later in 1985.  But among those who graduated around 1990, fully 15 percent 
worked in the financial sector in 2005.  Considering both the corporate and financial sectors the change 
was from 22.1 percent to 38.5 percent across the two graduating cohorts.  The increase for women was 
from 11.7 percent to 22.5 percent.  The premium to working in the financial sector among Harvard 
graduates was a whopping 195 percent and the premium in the corporate sector (executive and 
management jobs) was 25 percent relative to the average of other occupations in 2005.  See Goldin and 
Katz (2008) on the Harvard data and Philippon and Reshef (2009), more generally, for an analysis of the 
growth of the financial sector across the past century. 
2 The 2003 National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG) is used to obtain the fraction of BAs 
graduating from Research University I and Liberal Arts I colleges (Carnegie classifications) from 1970 to 
1973 and from 1990 to 1993 who received an MBA within ten years of graduating.  In this manner we 
exclude those who obtained an MBA in mid-career through an executive MBA program and those who 
obtained an MBA without having graduated from a U.S. university.  By limiting the undergraduate 
institutions to selective ones, we attempt to hold student quality constant over the two decades.  
3 Using the NSCG and restricting the sample to BAs from selective universities and colleges gives 12.7 
percent in 1970-73 and 39.5 percent in 1990-93 for the fraction female among those earning MBAs.   
4 In fact, the fraction female among all graduating MBAs has exceeded 30 percent for each of the past 25 
years (Source: U.S. Department of Education, NCES, Digest of Education Statistics, includes all masters 
in business fields).  The fraction has been lower in the top MBA programs.  It exceeded 30 percent at 
Harvard Business School starting around 2000 (HBS website) and has only just exceeded 30 percent at 
the University of Chicago Booth School of Business (UC Booth administrative data). 12-August-09, Dynamics 2 
 
highest levels of the corporate ladder.  The number of female CEOs among Execucomp firms 
increased from just four in 1992 to 34 in 2004, according to Wolfers (2006), but women still 
represent only 1.3 percent of the CEO-year observations in his sample.  
 
Various explanations have been proposed for women’s underperformance in the 
corporate and financial sectors.  Experimental evidence suggests that women have less taste for 
the highly-competitive environments in top finance and corporate jobs (Niederle and Vesterlund 
2007), and female MBAs may be less willing to aggressively negotiate for pay and promotion 
(Babcock and Laschever 2003).  MBA women may be subject to implicit or explicit gender 
discrimination (Bertrand, Chugh, and Mullainathan 2005), and even talented female MBAs may 
encounter difficulty getting recognized in male-dominated workplaces.
5  Women may also fall 
behind because of the career-family conflicts arising from the purportedly long hours, heavy 
travel commitments and inflexible schedules of most high-powered finance and corporate jobs.   
 
This paper speaks to the relative importance of these alternative explanations of the 
gender gap in career outcomes for highly-educated personnel in the U.S. corporate and financial 
sectors.  We study the careers of MBAs who graduated between 1990 and 2006 from a top U.S. 
business school—the Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago—and how career 
dynamics differ by gender.  We explore the evolution of the gender gap in earnings and labor 
supply for young professionals employed primarily in corporate, consulting and financial 
services jobs. 
 
We find that at the outset of their careers male and female MBAs have nearly identical 
labor incomes.  Their earnings, however, soon diverge.  The male annual earnings advantage 
reaches 30 log points five years after MBA completion and almost 60 log points ten to 16 years 
after MBA completion.  The share of female MBAs not employed also rises substantially in the 
decade following MBA completion with 13 percent of the women not working at all at nine 
years after MBA completion as compared with 1 percent of the men.  
 
                                                 
5 See also Bell (2005), who finds that women-led firms (e.g., firms where the CEO or the chairman of the 
board is a women) have a higher share of female executives in the other “top five paid” positions and 
remunerate these female executives more than non-women led firms do. 12-August-09, Dynamics 3 
 
 Most interesting is why female MBAs have not done as well as their male peers.  We 
identify three proximate reasons for the large and rising gender gap in earnings that emerges 
within a few years of MBA completion: differences in training prior to MBA graduation, 
differences in career interruptions, and differences in weekly hours worked.  These three 
determinants can explain the bulk of the gender differences in earnings across the years 
following MBA completion, but their relative importance changes with years since MBA 
completion.  We use our sample to explore this evolution by analyzing the gender gap by years 
after the MBA and by comparing women without any career interruptions to men.   
 
Male and female MBAs begin their careers with somewhat different training.  Men take 
more finance courses and have higher GPAs in business school.  Gender differences in grades 
and courses are not large but contribute to the earnings gap because of large labor market returns 
to these components of MBA training.  The large growth in the gender gap in earnings for MBAs 
during their first 15 years out is mainly a consequence of gender differences in career 
interruptions and weekly hours worked. Women have more career interruptions and work shorter 
hours, including more work in part-time positions and self-employment.  Although these 
differences are modest, the remuneration disparity they entail is exceptionally large.  The 
relationship between income and time off is highly non-linear for those in our sample.  Any 
career interruption—a period of six months or more out of work—is costly in terms of future 
earnings, and at ten years out women are 22 percentage points more likely than men to have had 
at least one career interruption.  Deviations from the male norm of high hours and continuous 
labor market attachment are greatly penalized in the corporate and financial sectors. 
 
The presence of children is the main contributor to the lesser job experience, greater 
career discontinuity and shorter work hours for female MBAs.  Across the first 15 years 
following the MBA, women with children have about an eight month deficit in actual post-MBA 
experience compared with the average man, while woman without children have a 1.5 month 
deficit.  Similarly women with children typically work 24 percent fewer weekly hours than the 
average male; women without children work only 3.3 percent fewer hours.  Women in our 
sample with children are not negatively selected on predicted earnings; MBA mothers are, if 
anything, positively selected on business school performance and earnings in the first few years 12-August-09, Dynamics 4 
 
following MBA completion.  By estimating panel data models with individual fixed-effects, we 
can observe exactly when women with children shift into lower hours positions and leave the 
labor force.  The careers of MBA mothers slow down substantially within a few years following 
their first birth.  But almost no decline in labor force participation and only a modest decline in 
hours worked are apparent in the two years before the first birth. 
 
 MBA mothers seem to actively choose jobs that are family friendly and avoid jobs with 
long hours and greater career advancement possibilities.  The dynamic impact of a first birth on 
women’s labor market outcomes greatly depends on spousal income.  New MBA mothers with 
higher-earnings spouses reduce their labor supply considerably more than mothers with lower-
earnings spouses.  In fact, the first birth has only a modest and temporary impact on earnings for 
MBA women with lower-earnings spouses. 
 
Our finding that human capital and labor supply factors can account for most of the 
gender gap in earnings among MBAs comports with that of Black, Haviland, Sanders and Taylor 
(2008) for a broader group of U.S. college-educated women between 25 and 60 years old in the 
1993 NSCG.  Our finding of a large increase in the gender gap during the first ten to 15 years in 
the careers of MBAs is similar to other studies exploring the dynamics of the gender earnings 
gap for new lawyers (Wood, Corcoran, and Courant 1993) and for broader samples of young 
workers (e.g., Light and Ureta 1995; Loprest 1992; and Manning and Swaffield 2008).
6 
 
B.  University of Chicago MBA Survey and Sample 
 
Our data come from a web-based survey we conducted of University of Chicago MBAs 
from the graduating classes of 1990 to 2006.
7  The participants were asked detailed questions 
about each of the jobs or positions they had since graduation, including earnings (both at the 
beginning and end of a given position), usual weekly hours worked, job function, sector, size of 
firm, and type of firm.  The earnings questions asked for total annual earnings, before taxes and 
                                                 
6 Weinberger (2009) presents somewhat contrasting evidence on the career dynamics of the gender gap 
for college graduates, using samples largely restricted to those remaining in full-time work. 
7 The survey was taken between November 2006 and June 2007.  Only full-time MBA graduates were 
included; part-time MBAs and executive MBAs were excluded.  12-August-09, Dynamics 5 
 
other deductions, in the first and last year at each job.
8  The responses to the earnings questions 
and usual weekly hours worked in each position were collected in discrete bins that were 
transformed into real-valued variables (at the mid-point of each bin).
9  Respondents were also 
asked why they had left a position and the reasons they took a subsequent job.  Each position, or 
spell with an employer, lasting six months or more constituted a separate “stage,” and all stages 
were surveyed for the variables just listed.  Information was gathered on all post-MBA spells of 
non-employment (periods of six months or longer in which an individual was not working for 
pay) and the reasons for these spells.   
 
The survey responses were converted into an (unbalanced) individual-year panel dataset.  
Individual earnings in a given year were computed by linear extrapolation based on earnings in 
the first and last year of a given stage and the length of that stage.  Administrative data from the 
University of Chicago were matched to our individual-level survey data providing information 
on MBA courses and grades, undergraduate school, undergraduate GPA, GMAT scores, and 
demographic information (age, ethnicity, and immigration status).   Respondents were also asked 
about their current marital status and, for those currently married or living with a partner (we will 
use “married” for both), about their spouse’s educational attainment, employment status and 
earnings.  All respondents were asked whether they had any children (biological or adopted), the 
year of birth of each child and the allocation of childcare responsibilities in pre-school years 
between themselves, their spouse, other family members, home care, and day care. 
 
  Among the MBAs in these classes with known e-mail addresses about 31 percent 
responded to the survey.
10  Of this group 2,485 (or 97 percent) were matched to University of 
Chicago administrative records.  These 1,856 men and 629 women form the basis of our sample.  
                                                 
8 Employees were asked to include salary and bonuses; the self-employed were asked for total earnings. 
9 Possible answers to the earnings question were < $50K, $50-$75K, $75-$100K, $100-$150K, $150-
$200K, $200-$300K, $300-$400K, $400-$500K,$500-$750K, $750K-$1MM, $1-$2MM, and > $2MM. 
We converted the answers into a real-valued earnings variable using the mid-point of each earnings bin; 
we assigned earnings of $25K to those that responded earning less than $50K and earnings of $3MM to 
those who indicated earning more than $2MM.  The response bins for the usual weekly hours worked 
questions ranged were < 20 hours, 20-30 hours, 30-40 hours, …, 90-100 hours, and > 100 hours. 
10 Because e-mail addresses can fail without generating a return e-mail, the 31 percent response rate 
should be considered a lower bound.  The survey was sent to each MBA’s “life-time” University of 
Chicago e-mail address and, when available, to his or her e-mail addresses listed in the Business School’s 
alumni directory. 12-August-09, Dynamics 6 
 
The University of Chicago has awarded about 570 MBAs annually since 1990 and 24 percent of 
these have gone to women.  The figure is considerably lower than the national average of MBAs 
earned by women, which was about 40 percent for the same period, although it is less out of line 
with the University of Chicago’s closest competitors.
11 
 
The respondents do not differ much from the non-respondents based on the observables.  
Respondents are, to a slight degree, disproportionately female and U.S. citizens, and they had 
somewhat better undergraduate and graduate records than the non-respondents (see Table A1).   
We find about the same gender differences in pre-MBA background, MBA course selection and 
MBA grades in the full sample of 1990-2006 graduates as in the sub-sample of those that 
participated in our survey (Table A2).  The women in our survey are slightly positively selected 
on their undergraduate GPA compared with their male peers, and the survey respondents for both 
genders are somewhat positively selected on GMAT scores and MBA GPA.  
 
Relative to the male MBAs, the women are a bit younger at graduate school entry and 
more often U.S. citizens; they did better as undergraduates but less well on the GMAT (Table 
A2).  Because the University of Chicago MBA program offers a flexible curriculum, 
considerable variation exists in course selection.  Women take relatively fewer finance and 
accounting classes but relatively more marketing classes.  Because of a school policy imposing a 
maximum mean grade per class, the Chicago MBA program has not been subject to much grade 
inflation and, in consequence, the MBA grades are reasonably comparable over time and reflect 
performance in the program.  Women have slightly lower graduate GPAs across all fields of 
study with the largest gender gap in grades found in finance courses. 
 
At the time of the survey, the female MBAs in the sample were less apt to be married 
than their male counterparts (0.65 versus 0.81).
12  If married, female MBAs were far less likely 
to have a husband with fewer years of schooling than they.  Female MBAs were less likely to 
have any children by the year they exited the program (4 percent versus 16 percent), and they 
remained less likely to have children by the time of the survey (42 percent versus 60 percent).  
                                                 
11 Among Harvard Business School MBAs for the same period, 31 percent were female. 
12 Summary information on the career and family characteristics of our survey respondents overall and by 
sex are given in Table A3. 12-August-09, Dynamics 7 
 
Among the sub-sample of survey respondents that we can observe nine years after the MBA 
program, 45 percent of women were still childless compared with 30 percent of men.  Female 
MBAs were more apt to have taken any time off work since receiving their MBA (27 percent 
versus 10 percent).  And 11 percent of the women across all cohorts were not working at the time 
of our survey as compared to just 2 percent of the men. 
 
Weekly hours are high for almost all MBA positions.  They are highest in investment 
banking and consulting, the two areas in which almost two-fifths of our sample took their first 
post-MBA jobs (13 percent and 26 percent, respectively).
13  The average investment banker put 
in a whopping 74 hours per week, the average consultant 61 hours per week.
14  Also reaching 
close to the 60 hours per week mark are those employed in venture capital and sales and trading.   
 
The share of MBAs working in the high hours sectors declines rapidly in the years 
following graduation.  The share working as consultants was 26 percent initially but 17 percent 
four years after graduation and 12 percent at seven years or more after.  MBAs also shift out of 
investment banking with only 6 percent still working as investment bankers at seven or more 
years after graduation.  Employment shares in investment management, company finance, and 
product management remain stable in the 15 years following graduation, and MBAs increasingly 
move into general management as their careers progress. 
 
C.  Descriptive Dynamics 
 
1. Labor Supply 
 
Early in their careers labor force participation among the MBAs in our Chicago alumni 
sample is extremely high and similar by gender (Table 1).  But the gender gap in labor force 
participation widens as careers progress with no more than 1 percent of males not working in any 
given post-graduation year as compared to 13 percent of women not in the labor force by year 
                                                 
13 In contrast, only about one-fifth of MBA graduates worked in either consulting or investment banking 
prior to entering the MBA program.   
14 See Table A4 data for mean weekly hours for the most common job functions in our MBA sample.  12-August-09, Dynamics 8 
 
nine and 17 percent of women not in the labor force ten or more years since their MBA.
15  
Differences are yet more pronounced comparing the fraction of men and women working full-
time and full-year in a given year (Table 1).
16  The fraction of men working full-time, year-
round, ranges between 91 and 94 percent in all years following graduation.  Although 90 percent 
of women are employed full-time and full-year immediately following graduation, 80 percent are 
five years out, 70 percent nine years out, and 62 percent ten or more years out.
17  For women 
with at least one child, 52 percent work full-time and full-year ten or more years after MBA 
completion and the figure is about the same (50 percent) for women with two or more children. 
 
Gender differences in labor force participation translate into differences in actual post 
MBA labor market experience.  The fraction of men who had at least one career interruption (a 
period of six months or more without working) is 4 percent a year after graduation and 10 
percent by ten years out.  In contrast, the fraction of women with at least one post-MBA career 
interruption is 9 percent a year after graduation but 32 percent by year nine and 40 percent ten to 
16 years after graduation. 
 
Non-work spells are generally brief for both men and women, as indicated by the 
tabulations of cumulative years not working by years since graduation in Table 1.  The average 
woman spends 0.22 years out of work by year five and 0.57 years out of work by year nine; for 
men, the equivalent figures are 0.06 at year five and 0.10 at year nine.  Ten years or more post-
MBA, mean cumulative years not working are 1.05 for women and just 0.12 for men. 
 
Weekly work hours are high for all MBAs and highest among the newly minted.  Men in 
their first year out average 61 hours per week; women average 59 hours, despite being less likely 
to start in investment banking where hours are especially long.
18  Hours of work decline for male 
                                                 
15 The employment rate is relatively low for both men and women in the year of MBA graduation since 
the entry-level MBA market takes some time to clear. 
16 Our survey did not include a question on “full-time” versus “part-time” work.  We assign “full-time” 
(“part-time”) status to those who report working > [30-40] hours/week (at most [30-40] hours/week). 
17 Our figure of 62 percent is close to that from an often-cited Catalyst study by Hollenshead and Wilt 
(2000), showing that 66 percent of the female graduates from 12 top MBA programs were working full-
time (but not necessarily year-round) approximately ten to 16 years after receiving their MBA. 
18 See Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor (1996) on the role of similarly long hours for law associates at large 
U.S. law firms in the career dynamics of young lawyers. 12-August-09, Dynamics 9 
 
and female MBAs in the years following graduation, but far more so for women.  Four years 
after receiving their MBA, women work around 55 hours per week while men work around 59 
hours; nine years out, women work around 51 hours per week, while men work around 57 hours.   
 
Although hours of work are long for most MBAs, a large share of MBA women work 
part-time (defined as 30 to 40 hours or less per week).  The incidence of part-time work among 
employed MBA women increases with years since graduation, from 5 percent during the first 
year to 22 percent at ten to 16 years out.  Whereas about 17 percent of MBA women are not 
working at ten to 16 years out, another 18 percent [0.22 × (1 – 0.17)] are working part-time.
19  
Part-time work, therefore, is more prevalent than is non-employment for MBA women, even 
more than a decade after the MBA.  But part-time positions are rare for those who remain in the 
corporate sector, especially in investment banking and consulting.  One year after graduation, 4 
percent of salaried women work part-time, 8 percent by year five, and 12 percent at ten years or 
more post-MBA.  How, then, do 22 percent of MBA women 10 to 16 years out work part-time? 
 
MBA women use self-employment as a means to work fewer hours and 57 percent of the 
MBA women who work part-time do so through self-employment.  Immediately following 
graduation, 29 percent of self-employed women work part-time; 32 percent do by year five.  Ten 
years or more post-MBA, 62 percent of self-employed women work part-time.
20  In contrast, 
only 15 percent of self-employed men work part-time ten to 16 years out.  The shares of working 
men and women who are self-employed are similar up to nine years following graduation 
(growing from less than 2 percent at graduation to 11 to 13 percent nine years out), but a surge in 
self-employment among MBA women occurs ten to 16 years out, with 20 percent of working 
women being self-employed compared with 14 percent for men.  
                                                 
19 Gender differences in labor supply for Chicago Booth MBAs are quite similar to gender gaps around 
ten years after MBA completion for those in the 1989 to 1992 BA cohort of the Harvard and Beyond 
(H&B) sample who went on to get an MBA.  The H&B male MBAs in these cohorts had a 98 percent 
employment rate as compared with an 82 percent employment rate for the H&B female MBAs in 2006.  
Conditional on being employed in 2006, the H&B male MBAs worked 55 hours per week on average 
with only 3 percent working part-time, and the H&B female MBAs worked 44 hours per week on average 
with 29 percent working part-time.  A substantial gender gap in hours of work for those who received 
MBAs from 1990 to 2003 is also apparent for the 2003 NSCG with employed male MBAs working 49 
hours per week on average as compared to 44 hours per week for employed female MBAs. 
20 The share of part-timers is even higher among self-employed women with no employees: nearly 75 
percent of them work part-time ten to 16 years out. 12-August-09, Dynamics 10 
 
 
By far the most common job function among self-employed part-timers is consulting. 
More than 30 percent of self-employed part-timers are consultants, whereas among full-timers 
only 18 percent are.  For those who work in established firms, however, consulting offers less 
opportunity for part-time work: fewer than 3 percent of salaried part-timers are consultants. 
 
In summary, MBAs in our sample are concentrated in job functions that generally have 
long hours.  Hours decline with time since MBA for both men and women, in part reflecting a 
move out of investment banking and consulting and towards general management positions in 
corporations.  But weekly hours worked drop considerably more for women, driven largely by a 
growing share working part-time, often self-employed.  Women are increasingly more likely to 
be out of the workforce with years since MBA, although the average female MBA accumulates 
only half a year of non-employment in the first nine years after graduation.   Part-time work for 
women is a more important factor than “opting out” behavior (non-employment) in explaining 
the lower incidence of full-time and full-year work for women than for men in the first 15 years 
after MBA completion.     
 
2. Earnings 
 
Labor market earnings are a key summary measure of career progress and ultimate 
success.  We construct earnings for each calendar year by taking the annualized total earnings 
(including bonuses) from the stage worked at the end of that calendar year.  In this manner, 
earnings per year are constructed as “full year” earnings in the last job held in that year and not 
necessarily actual earnings for the year.
21   
 
Earnings (expressed in 2006 dollars) advance substantially with time since MBA, as is 
clear from Table 2 and Figure 1.  The growth is a hefty 8.9 percent average annual rate for all 
                                                 
21 We have also averaged the annualized earnings of all working stages during the calendar year for those 
with multiple stages in a year (weighting each stage by its length).  This definition also computes full-year 
earnings, which may differ from actual earnings for those employed only part of the year.  There are no 
notable differences in the findings between the two earnings measures. 12-August-09, Dynamics 11 
 
MBAs.
22  The average MBA earns $126K at graduation (median is $122K) and close to $370K 
nine years out (median is around $190K).  Both the level and rate of change are greatest for those 
starting in investment banking, which attracts a substantial number of recent MBA graduates.  
Those starting their careers in investment banking earn on average $170K at graduation (median 
is $160K) and close to $700K nine years out (median is $470K), whether or not they are still 
employed in investment banking.  Earnings levels and growth are similar for investment 
management (not reported in the table).  The consulting track, the other most prevalent career 
option among MBAs, is less remunerative than investment banking and investment management.   
 
Mean earnings by sex are comparable directly following MBA receipt, but they diverge 
every subsequent year.  Women earn $115K on average at graduation and $250K nine years out; 
men earn $130K on average at graduation and $400K nine years out.  Median salaries by sex 
also diverge in favor of men with years since graduation but not by as much as do mean salaries.  
 
  Mean differences in earnings between men and women (conditional only on all cohort × 
year dummies) are given in Table 3 arrayed by years since receipt of the MBA.  The 11 log point 
gender earnings gap at graduation jumps to 31 log points at five years out, 40 log points at nine 
years out and nearly 60 log points at ten or more years out (col. 2).  The time profile of the 
earnings gap is roughly similar for the subset who start a new job in that year (col. 3). 
 
D.  Explaining the Gender Gap in Labor Supply 
 
Gender differences in labor supply expand substantially with years since completing an 
MBA even when adding cohort (MBA graduating class) effects, calendar year effects, and their 
interactions (Table 3, cols. 4 to 8).  Nine years out, women are about 12 percentage points less 
likely than men to be working (col. 5) and have spent half a year more than the average man out 
of work since the MBA (col. 4).  Although only a 3 log point difference in weekly hours worked 
exists in the first post-MBA job, the difference grows to about 14 log points nine years out and to 
20 log points at ten or more years after graduation (col. 8). 
 
                                                 
22 The calculation assumes an average of 13 years for the ten to 16-year cell. 12-August-09, Dynamics 12 
 
The reasons for gender differences in labor supply are explored in Tables 4 and 5, which 
include a full set of cohort × year dummies as well as controls for pre-MBA characteristics and 
MBA performance.
23  The unit of observation is a survey respondent in a given year.  Table 4 
explores the role of children and Table 5 adds comparisons by spousal income. 
 
The 8.4 percentage point gap in employment between men and women, perhaps not 
surprisingly, is largely driven by women with children, as can be seen by comparing the first two 
columns of Table 4.  A woman with at least one child is 20 percentage points less likely to work 
in a given year than the average man, whereas a woman without children is only 3 percentage 
points less likely to be employed than the average man (col. 2).  A woman with at least one child 
has about 0.7 fewer years of actual labor market experience than the typical man in the sample; 
this difference is only 0.1 year for a woman without children (col. 4).  Although there is a 9 log 
point mean difference in weekly hours worked between employed men and women, it is 24 log 
points for women with kids and only 3 log points for women without kids (col. 6). 
 
More interesting is that the “impact” of children on female labor supply differs to a large 
degree by spousal earnings (Table 5).  Because our survey asked for spousal earnings only in the 
current year, we use spousal current (survey date) earnings as a proxy for spousal earnings in any 
prior year.  We then separate women into those with “lower” earnings (less than $100K per year) 
spouses, “medium” earnings (between $100K and $200K per year) spouses and “high” earnings 
(more than $200K per year) spouses.  These spousal earnings categories are then interacted with 
an indicator variable for whether or not a woman has at least one child in a given year, thereby 
comparing the average man to six different groups of women.
24 
 
The effect of motherhood on the likelihood that a woman is not working is more than 
twice as large if the woman has a high-earnings spouse rather than a lower-earnings spouse: 
                                                 
23 The pre-MBA controls include a quadratic in age; a U.S. citizen dummy; dummies for race; dummies 
for “top 10” and “top 10 to 20” undergraduate institutions (from the U.S. News & World Report 
rankings); undergraduate GPA; quantitative and verbal GMAT scores; and dummies for industry and job 
function in the last job before entering the MBA program.  Our controls for MBA performance are the 
MBA GPA and the fraction of finance-related classes taken during the program.   
24 Sample sizes differ between Tables 4 and 5 since the Table 5 specifications include only women who 
were married or living with someone at the survey date.  12-August-09, Dynamics 13 
 
these mothers are 30 percentage points less likely to work than the average man (Table 5, col. 1; 
0.119 + 0.185).   Mothers with a medium-earnings spouse also work less than those with a 
lower-earnings spouse, but the difference is smaller and not statistically significant.  Similarly, 
mothers with high-earnings spouses accumulate about six months more in non-employment 
spells following MBA completion and, even when employed, have a workweek that is 19 log 
points shorter than mothers with low-earnings spouses (cols. 2 and 3).  
 
Among women without children greater spousal earnings appear to increase, rather than 
decrease, labor supply.  In fact, a woman without children married to high-earnings spouse is 
about as likely to work (the gap is only 2 percentage points), to accumulate post-MBA work 
experience, and to put in a long work week (women are actually higher by 3 log points) as the 
typical male in our sample.  These findings suggest positive assortative mating based on 
preferences for work.  The sharp reversal in labor supply patterns for MBA women by spousal 
income that occurs with motherhood seems most consistent with the notion that previously hard-
working women slow down after their first birth if they have a high-earnings spouse. 
 
Because spousal income may be endogenous to own labor supply choices and because we 
measure spousal income only in the survey year, we have replicated the analysis using spousal 
education levels.  We contrast the labor supply of mothers married to men who are at least as 
educated as they (having MBA, JD, MD and related degrees, or PhD) to that of mothers with 
less-educated spouses.  We find the same qualitative pattern of results as in Table 5.
25  
 
MBA mothers whose spouses earn over $150K indicate being responsible for 52 percent 
of their children’s care as compared with only 32 percent for MBA mothers with lower-earnings 
spouses.
26  The difference is almost fully explained by the use of formal day care center (12 
percent with high-earnings spouses versus 31 percent with lower-earnings spouses).   That is, 
MBA mothers with better-off husbands take a larger share of the responsibility for child care 
(relative to their spouses and others) than do other MBA women.  Greater spousal income 
                                                 
25 We also investigated how children affect male labor supply based on wives’ earnings (and education), 
but found no significant impacts of the presence of children or of spousal income on male labor supply. 
26 When we use three types of earnings we called the > $200K group “high,” but when we use two 
groups, as we do here, we term the > $150K group “high.” 12-August-09, Dynamics 14 
 
purchases more high-priced child-care time of the MBA mother, not more nannies.   
 
  In summary, parental status accounts for the bulk of the difference in labor supply 
between male and female MBAs.  The impact of children on female labor supply is strongly 
related to spousal income, with mothers in better-off households slowing down much more.
27 
 
E.  Explaining the Gender Gap in Earnings 
 
To understand why female MBAs have lower incomes than male MBAs, we estimate 
(log) annual earnings equations that pool all individual-year observations.  The impact of the 
various factors discussed, including pre-MBA characteristics, MBA courses, post-MBA job 
experience, and non-working spells, on the gender gap in earnings, is explored.  The estimation 
in Table 6 is done with and without controlling for weekly hours worked.  The novelty of the 
estimation is our use of information on all job stages previously held by an individual. 
 
The raw gap in earnings between men and women in the pooled sample is about 29 log 
points including only cohort × year dummies (col. 1).  The inclusion of pre-MBA characteristics, 
MBA GPA, and fraction of finance classes reduces the gender gap to 19 log points (col. 2).  The 
difference in mean MBA GPA between men and women in the sample of 0.13 (3.38 versus 3.25) 
implies (using the estimated coefficient of 0.429 on MBA GPA in col. 2) that the gender 
difference in MBA grades alone can account for a gender earnings gap of nearly 6 log points.  
Each additional finance class increases earnings by about 8 log points and women take about half 
a class less in finance than men.
28 
 
Labor supply factors explain most of the remaining gender gap in earnings.  The 
inclusion of a full set of dummy variables for weekly hours worked reduces the raw gender gap 
of 29 log points (col. 1) to 17 log points (col. 4).  Adding hours worked to the specification 
including pre-MBA characteristics and MBA performance lowers the remaining gender gap to 9 
                                                 
27 Of course, neither marital nor parental statuses are randomly assigned and it is possible that women’s 
decisions to get married, whom to marry and whether or not to have children are related to unobservable 
characteristics that might directly impact earnings.  We explore that possibility below. 
28 Finance classes pay off even for those not starting in investment banking or investment management. 12-August-09, Dynamics 15 
 
log points (col. 5).  The gender earnings gap is reduced to just 6.4 log points (col. 6) with the 
further addition of a quadratic term for post-MBA years of actual work experience and a dummy 
variable for the presence of any post-MBA career interruption.  Augmenting the model with 
(arguably less exogenous) variables to control for reasons for choosing one’s current job, job 
function, and employer type further reduces the coefficient on the female dummy to a 
(statistically insignificant) –3.8 log points (col. 9).
29 
 
The estimates from our preferred specification in col. (6) of Table 6 can be used to obtain 
the earnings penalty from taking time out.  The loss is 23 log points from taking any time out 
plus an additional amount from accumulating less post-MBA experience.  An MBA observed six 
years after business school graduation with at least one non-employment spell in that period had 
an average employment spell of 4.97 years and thus an average non-employment spell of 1.03 
years.  The penalty from taking that amount of time off is 37 log points of which about two-
thirds is due to the discrete earnings loss from taking any time off.
30   The earnings loss from 
time out is even greater using the estimates that do not hold hours constant (col. 3).  The full 
earnings loss (among the employed), using those coefficients, is around 46 log points.  Wage 
penalties we estimate (for the typical out-of-work spell at six years after MBA completion) are 
uniformly high across all career tracks: 36 log points in consulting, 45 log points in investment 
banking or investment management, and 45 log points in other functions. 
31  The earnings loss 
from any career interruption is large in our MBA sample. 
 
The models in Table 6 restrict the impact of career interruptions to be identical for men 
and women.  Although it is possible that women are more heavily penalized for taking time out, 
estimates from separate earnings regressions by sex using the specification from Table 6, col. (6) 
do not support that suspicion.   The wage penalty for men, using our standardized career 
interruption at six years out, is 45 log points whereas that for women is 26 log points.  Taking 
                                                 
29 The basic findings are almost identical for log hourly wage regressions as for log annual earnings 
regressions that include controls for weekly hours worked.  See Table A5 for log hourly wage regressions, 
comparable to the specifications in Table 6, for the full pooled sample. 
30 The penalty for an average non-work spell of an individual 6 years out from the MBA would be: 
[(0.085 × 4.967) + (0.005 × 4.967
2) – 0.228] – [(0.085 × 6) + (0.005 × 6
2)] = 0.372.  Note that in the 
entire sample 27 percent of the women, but 10 percent of the men, took time off. 
31 We re-estimated the specification in col. (6) separately for each of the subgroups. 12-August-09, Dynamics 16 
 
any time out appears more harmful for men (26 log points) than for women (11 log points).
32  
Similar calculations for a standardized career interruption based on the col. (3) specification, 
which does not hold hours constant, result in penalties for taking time out of 48 log points for 
men and 38 log points for women.  For women, but less so for men, a career interruption usually 
goes hand in hand with a substantial reduction in weekly hours upon returning to work.  The data 
do not indicate that MBA women lose more than MBA men for taking time out.  It appears that 
everyone is penalized heavily for deviating from the norm. 
 
  An analysis of the gender earnings gap by years since MBA graduation is given in Table 
7.  The (uncorrected) gender wage gap is 9 log points just after MBA completion.  It rises to 25 
log points three years out, to 38 log points at nine years out, and to 57 log points for the ten to 16 
years out group.  But even the largest of these gender gaps in earnings is entirely eliminated by 
the inclusion of the observables, particularly job interruptions and hours of work.  That detail, 
however, overlooks the changing importance of the various factors with time since MBA. 
 
Within the first three years after receipt of the MBA the earnings gap between men and 
women expands by 16 log points.  As much as a third of the increase appears to be due to 
growing labor market returns with experience to pre-MBA characteristics as well as MBA course 
performance.  Gender differences in career interruptions and the accumulation of years of labor 
market experience do not expand much in the first three years in the labor market (as seen in 
Table1), but the gender gap in hours worked is already an important factor for the gender 
earnings gap by year three (as suggested by comparing the gender gap estimates in rows 4 and 5 
of Table 7).  During the next six years (from year three to nine), the gender earnings gap grows 
by another 12 log points.  At this juncture career interruptions become a more important factor 
and weekly hours also play a key role.  The addition of controls for career interruptions reduces 
the 12.4 log point increase from year three to nine by 5.6 log points and the inclusion of controls 
for weekly hours (in row 5) more than eliminates the remaining growth of the gender earnings 
gap.  Of the increase in the gender earnings gap by 29 log points in the first nine years following 
                                                 
32 A larger discrete earnings loss associated with having any career interruption for men than for women 
is also found in earnings regressions including person fixed effects. 12-August-09, Dynamics 17 
 
MBA completion, 8 log points can be accounted for by adding pre-job characteristics and a 
further 19 log points by adding controls for career interruptions and hours of work. 
 
Because our full sample is an unbalanced panel, the dynamics of change in the gender 
gap could reflect differential changes in sample composition by sex with years since MBA 
completion.  To address this issue, we have replicated the analysis in Table 7 limiting the sample 
to those who completed their MBA prior to 1998, holding sample composition constant up to 
eight years out.  The results are similar for the full sample and for the pre-1998 cohorts.   
 
Large earnings differences relative to men are apparent even for women who have taken 
no career breaks up to the post-MBA year considered (see Table A6).  The total change in the 
earnings gap to year nine is 20 log points.  Most (70 percent) of this total change can be 
accounted for by the increasing importance of pre-job (MBA and pre-MBA) characteristics and 
rising differences in weekly hours between men and this group of women. 
 
Even women with no career interruptions have children and some of these women will 
work fewer hours and be less available for career moves.  Limiting the sample to women without 
children and with no career interruptions by ten years out makes the career paths of the women 
in the sample more similar to those of men.  For that comparison, the gender earning gap starts 
out slightly larger than for all women, but it grows less rapidly (see Table A7).  The gap in 
earnings between this sub-group of women and all men increases by 15 log points in the first ten 
years after the MBA.  This entire increase in the gender pay gap can be accounted for by the 
greater importance of pre-MBA and MBA characteristics with years since MBA receipt.   
Furthermore, we find no growth in the gender gap in weekly hours worked with years since 
MBA for the women in this sub-group. 
 
F.  Selection and Family Status  
 
A large part of the difference between male and female earnings comes from job 
interruptions and most job interruptions are due to children.  MBA women who become mothers 
might be selected on unobservables that could directly lead to lower earnings in the absence of 12-August-09, Dynamics 18 
 
children.  But we uncover no evidence that MBA women who marry and have children are 
drawn from the lower part of the female earnings distribution (Table 8).  To the contrary, we find 
that married women have slightly higher predicted earnings than unmarried women and those 
with children have slightly higher predicted earnings than those without children, using a 
measure of predicted earnings based on pre-MBA characteristics and MBA performance.
33  
MBA women who have children are not negatively selected in terms of predicted earnings levels 
and may even be positively selected.
  MBA mothers are, as well, positively selected on actual 
early career earnings as well.  In unreported regressions, we find that the MBA women with a 
first birth three or more years following MBA completion earned about 4 log points more in the 
first two years following MBA completion than their female classmates who do not have 
children by our survey date.  We also find some positive assortative mating on earnings potential 
with women whose spouses are more-educated having slightly higher predicted earnings than 
women who marry less educated men (col. 3 of Table 8). 
 
G.  More on the Role of Children and Career Interruptions in the Dynamics of the Gender Gap 
 
Because differences in earnings and employment between male and female MBAs appear 
to be largely associated with the presence of children, we use the (retrospectively-constructed) 
panel structure of the data to explore career dynamics after a first birth in Tables 9 and 10.  The 
regressions include person fixed effects, cohort × year dummies, a quadratic in age, and a set of 
indicator variables for the year surrounding the first child’s birth—dummy variables for one or 
two years before the birth, the year of the birth, one or two years after the birth, three or four 
years after the birth, and greater than four years after the birth.  The coefficients on these 
variables summarize the dynamics of labor supply and earnings responses to a first birth relative 
to the base period of three or more years prior to the first birth.
34 
 
MBA women reduce their labor supply on both the extensive and intensive margins after 
a birth.  There is a large decline in labor force participation in the year of the first birth and a 
                                                 
33 The predicted value of log (annual earnings) for all individuals is regressed on interactions of marital 
status and sex in one regression and, in a separate regression, on interactions of sex with whether an 
individual has a child.  The predicted value of earnings is based on a full set of pre-MBA characteristics 
and MBA performance measures (see the notes to Table 8 for details). 
34 The regression samples exclude individuals who had children prior to completing their MBA. 12-August-09, Dynamics 19 
 
further reduction over the next four years.  A woman’s likelihood of not working in a year is 
about 13 percentage points higher in the two years immediately following her first birth than in 
the base period, increasing to 18 to 19 percentage points higher at three years following the birth 
and beyond (Table 9, col. 2).  Similarly, weekly hours worked for the employed (col. 10) 
decrease discretely in the year of the first birth and continue to decline over the next four years, 
reaching a 24 log point deficit relative to the pre-birth base period.  This reduction in weekly 
hours is associated with a large shift into part-time work and self-employment in the four years 
following a first birth.
 35  In contrast, there is no decline in labor force participation and only a 
small (4 log points) decline in weekly hours worked in the one or two years before the first birth.  
MBA moms are, if anything, slightly more likely to work in the two years that precede the birth 
of their first child than in the base period of three or more years before their first birth. 
 
Women’s earnings (among those remaining employed) decline only modestly in the year 
of the first birth but decline sharply over the next several years especially around three to four 
years after the birth (Table 9, col. 4).  A woman’s earnings drop by about 30 log points relative 
to the pre-birth base period at three years or more after the birth.  When we control for hours 
worked (col. 11), we find that annual earnings (essentially hourly wage rates) are unchanged in 
the two years immediately following the first birth but decrease by 6 to 7 log points after that. 
 
Thus, earnings decline linearly with hours worked in the first two years after the first 
birth, but (hourly) wage penalties (associated with career interruptions) become evident for MBA 
women about three years after the birth.  A woman’s annual earnings (including the non-
employed) fall modestly in the year of the first birth and continue declining over the next several 
years reaching a $100K deficit relative to the base period by five years after the birth (col. 8).   
 
The decreases in women’s labor supply and earnings that expand three to four years after 
a first birth could reflect the impact of subsequent births.  But we find large reductions in labor 
                                                 
35 The share of MBA women working part-time increases from 5 percent two years before a first birth to 
34 percent four years after a first birth with about half of this increase accounted for by women shifting 
into self-employment.  Herr and Wolfram (2009) emphasize that corporate work environments contribute 
to MBA mothers’ decisions to exit the labor force at motherhood.  We find, in addition, that MBA 
mothers shift into self-employment, and also that self-employment enables part-time work. 12-August-09, Dynamics 20 
 
supply and earnings four years after a first birth even for women who do not have a subsequent 
birth.
36  In fact, we find the birth of a second child has little additional adverse effect on women’s 
labor supply and earnings.   
 
In contrast, MBA men with children see their earnings increase, not decrease, especially 
five years and more after birth of their first child (Table 9, cols. 3, 5, and 7).  Male labor supply 
is virtually unaffected by fatherhood in our MBA sample (cols. 1 and 9). 
 
Obvious reasons exist why women choose to cut back on work after giving birth.  But 
MBA mothers may also be forced out, or at least out of the fast-track.  Suggestive evidence 
exists, however, that the observed patterns of decreased labor supply and earnings substantially 
reflect women’s choices given family constraints and the inflexibility of work schedules in many 
corporate and finance sector jobs.  The differential impact of children on women’s labor supply 
by her spouse’s income and education (see Table 5) seems consistent with such an interpretation.  
 
The differential dynamic impacts of a first birth on women’s labor market outcomes by 
husband’s income are illustrated in Table 10, where we estimate separate regressions (using the 
Table 9 specifications) for married women by spousal earnings (more than or less than $200K).
37 
New MBA mothers with higher-earning spouses reduce their likelihood of working by 17 
percentage points in the year of first birth (relative to the base period) and by 28 percentage 
points three to four years after the birth (col. 6).  In contrast, MBA women with lower-earning 
spouses have an increased employment rate in the two years prior to a first birth and experience 
no noticeable change in the likelihood of employment (relative to the pre-birth base period) 
following the birth (col. 1).  Weekly hours (conditional on employment) drop for both groups in 
the year of a first birth and in the four years following the birth (cols. 4 and 9).  The total annual 
earnings decline (including those not working) associated with motherhood is large and 
persistent for MBA women with higher-earning spouses.  The decline is quite modest for women 
with lower-earning spouses and does not persist beyond the first four years after the first birth. 
 
                                                 
36 These findings derive from (unreported) regressions in which we add a dummy variable, to the 
specifications in Table 9, for the two years immediately following the birth of a second child. 
37 These results are replicated in Table A8 for spouses by education group rather than income. 12-August-09, Dynamics 21 
 
Corroborating evidence arguing for some type of choice can be gleaned from the reasons 
MBA women give for not working, leaving their previous job, and for choosing a new job (Table 
11).  The probability that a woman is not working for career-related reasons (which include 
“layoff” and “suitable job not available”) does not change post-birth (col. 2).  Instead, all of the 
reduction in labor force participation for MBA women following a first birth observed in Table 9 
can be attributed to an increase in the likelihood of not working for family-related reasons 
(which include “do not need or want to work,” “home taking care of parents or other relatives” 
and “home raising children”) as seen in Table 11, col. (1).   
 
What motivates mothers to choose their current job largely differs from what motivated 
them before they had children.  Post-birth, women are 20 to 26 percentage points more likely to 
be in a job chosen for family-related reasons than in the pre-birth base period (col. 3) and 13 to 
21 percentage points less likely to have chosen their job for career-related reasons (col. 4).  
These changes in career orientation are not limited to when their children were infants but persist 
five or more years after the first birth.
38  
 
Choice does not mean that earnings are not greatly affected, and large negative wage 
changes are associated with taking a new job for family-related reasons and for leaving a prior 
job for family-related reasons (Table A9, panel B).  Earnings decline 64 log points when the new 
job is chosen because of “flexible hours,” 20 log points when the new job is chosen because of 
an “opportunity to work remotely,” and 7 log points when the new job is chosen because of a 
“limited travel schedule.”   The large role of family factors and desires for flexible hours in the 
job mobility decisions of women with children generates the striking differences in the wage 
changes by gender and parental status associated with job changes (Table A9, panel A).  Job 
changes in our MBA sample are income neutral for women without children and for men.  But 
women with children lose nearly 18 log points in earnings when they shift jobs. 
 
MBA mothers may emphasize family over career in choosing their jobs, but it is still 
possible that their jobs involve lower earnings and fewer career advancement opportunities 
                                                 
38 Family reasons for choosing a given job include: “flexible hours”; “opportunity to work remotely”; and 
“limited travel schedule.”  Career reasons for choosing a given job include: “career advancement or 
broadening”; “compensation and other benefits,” and “prestige.” 12-August-09, Dynamics 22 
 
because of differential treatment.  This claim is difficult to evaluate directly.  We examine the 
likelihood of leaving a given job, as well as the likelihood of leaving for family or career-related 
reasons, conditioning on the stated reasons for originally choosing that job (Table 11, cols. 5 to 
8).  If MBA mothers were being sidelined in their current jobs, one might have expected them to 
be more likely to quit (or even be forced out) for career-related reasons.  Yet, we find little 
evidence of that (cols. 5, 7 and 8).  We do find that women are more likely to leave a job for 
family reasons in the two years before a birth (col. 6), suggesting some re-optimization of job 
choices in anticipation of children.  Of course, the evidence does not rule out discrimination 
since women facing such career barriers still may give family reasons for job changes. 
 
H.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
We have examined gender differences in the career dynamics of MBAs who graduated 
from a top U.S. business school—the Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago —
from 1990 to 2006.  Immediately following MBA completion male and female MBAs from this 
elite program have nearly identical labor incomes and work nearly the same weekly hours.  But 
the gender gap in annual earnings expands considerably as their careers progress reaching almost 
60 log points at ten to 16 years after MBA completion.   
 
We identify three proximate factors that can explain the large and rising gender gap in 
earnings: (1) a modest male advantage in training prior to MBA graduation combined with rising 
labor market returns to such training with post-MBA experience; (2) gender differences in career 
interruptions combined with large earnings losses associated with any career interruption (of six 
or more months); and (3) growing gender differences in weekly hours worked with years since 
MBA.  Differential changes by sex in labor market activity in the period surrounding a first birth 
play a key role in this process.  The presence of children is associated with less accumulated job 
experience, more career interruptions, shorter work hours, and substantial earnings declines for 
female but not for male MBAs.  The one exception is that an adverse impact of children on 
employment and earnings is not found for female MBAs with lower-earning husbands. 
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Are career-family tradeoffs faced by female MBAs in the corporate and financial sectors 
similar to those in other high-powered occupations?  We have done a preliminary exploration of 
these issues using the Harvard and Beyond (H&B) project to examine the careers of Harvard 
graduates from the undergraduate classes of 1969 to 1973, 1979 to 1982, and 1989 to 1992.
39  
We find that female MBAs appear to have a more difficult time combining career and family 
than do female physicians, PhDs, and lawyers.
40   
 
Fifteen years after obtaining their BA women who earned an MBA had the lowest labor 
force participation rates, the lowest share working full-time and full-year, and took the greatest 
amount of (non-educational) time off from employment compared with others having 
professional degrees and PhDs (Goldin and Katz 2008).  The differences are greatest for those 
with children.
41  Less than 50 percent of the MBA women were both in the labor force (part-time 
or full-time) and had children 15 years out; in contrast, the same figures for the other groups are 
65 percent for MDs and about 55 percent for the PhDs and JDs.  Female physicians take the 
briefest non-employment spells after having a child, followed by PhDs, then lawyers, and finally 
MBAs who take the greatest amount of time off for family reasons.  For those graduating college 
around 1990, only 75 percent of mothers with MBAs were employed 15 years after Harvard 
graduation compared with 96 percent of those with MDs, 89 percent of those with PhDs, and 82 
percent of those with JDs; only mothers without any post-graduate education were less likely to 
work 15 years out than mothers with MBAs (73 percent).
42   
 
Log earnings regressions for 2005 annual earnings in the H&B sample using a 
specification similar to that in Table 6, col. (6), indicate larger earnings costs to career 
                                                 
39 See Goldin and Katz (2008) for details. 
40 For analyses of gender earnings and promotion gaps, and career-family trade-offs, for professions, see 
Wood, Corcoran, and Courant (1993) on lawyers; Sasser (2005) and Reyes (2006) on physicians; Preston 
(2004) and Ginther and Kahn (2006) on science professionals; and Ginther (2006) on academics.  In 
related work, Ellwood, Wilde, and Batchelder (2004) find larger negative impacts of childbearing on the 
wage trajectories of high skill (high AFQT) women than of less skilled (low AFQT) women. 
41 Working with a partially overlapping sample of women who received BAs from Harvard University 
between 1988 and 1991, Herr and Wolfram (2009) find nearly identical results to those in the H&B 
sample for labor force participation rates among those graduating college around 1990. 
42 Women with children in our MBA sample were slightly more likely to be employed than in the H&B 
sample (77 percent were working ten or more years after their MBA).  If we restrict the H&B data to 
MBAs from top business schools the results are closer to the University of Chicago MBA sample. 12-August-09, Dynamics 24 
 
interruptions for MBAs than for MDs, JDs, or PhDs.  The earnings penalty in 2005 for an 18 
month career interruption for those in the Harvard graduating classes of 1989 to 1992, at around 
six to 12 years after completing a graduate or professional degree, was 0.16 log points for MDs, 
0.34 log points for JDs and PhDs, and 0.53 log points for MBAs.  Furthermore, a large discrete 
and persistent earnings loss is associated with any career interruption for MBAs, while for MDs 
the cost of taking time off is fairly linear in foregone labor market experience. 
 
We can only speculate about why different costs exist to taking time off and opting for 
lower hours across professions.  Inherent differences in production technologies and in the 
organization of work may make the productivity costs to discontinuous experience and more 
flexible hours greater in the business and corporate sectors than in medicine or academia.  The 
economic benefits of re-organizing work to reduce the productivity costs of career interruptions 
and more flexible work options may be greater in professions where there is a larger share (or 
critical mass) of women in the talent pool.  A tipping point may have been reached in fields 
where women have become a majority (or nearly the majority) of the young talent (such as 
medicine, veterinary medicine, optometry, pharmacy, and accounting) but not yet for MBAs and 
the business and financial sectors.  It is also possible that there is more career commitment in 
those professions requiring greater upfront time investment, such as a PhD or an MD as opposed 
to an MBA.  Additionally, female MBAs often have husbands with higher earnings than female 
PhDs and MDs allowing them the luxury to slowdown in the market and spend more time with 
their children.  The career costs of that decision may not be evident until much later. 12-August-09, Dynamics 25 
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Table 1  
Labor Supply by Gender and Number of Years since Graduation: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Number of Years since Graduation 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ≥ 10 
  Share Not Working at All in Current Year 
Female  0.054 0.012 0.017 0.027 0.032 0.050 0.067 0.084 0.089 0.129 0.166 
Male  0.028 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.010 
  Share Working Full-time/Full-year (52 weeks and > 30 to 40 hours per week) 
Female  n.a.  0.89 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.78 0.76 0.72 0.69 0.62 
Male  n.a.  0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92 
  Cumulative Share with Any No Work Spell (until given year) 
Female  0.064 0.088 0.116 0.143 0.161 0.193 0.229 0.259 0.287 0.319 0.405 
Male  0.032 0.040 0.052 0.064 0.071 0.077 0.081 0.082 0.090 0.095 0.101 
  Cumulative Years Not Working 
Female  0  0.050 0.077 0.118 0.157 0.215 0.282 0.366 0.426 0.569 1.052 
Male  0  0.026 0.036 0.045 0.057 0.060 0.069 0.075 0.084 0.098 0.120 
  Mean Weekly Hours Worked for the Employed 
Female  59.1 58.8 57.1 56.2 55.3 54.8 54.7 53.7 52.9 51.5 49.3 
Male  60.9 60.7 60.2 59.5 59.1 58.6 57.9 57.6 57.6 57.5 56.7 
  Share Working Part-time (≤ 30 to 40 hours per week) 
Female  0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.22 
Male  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
  Share Working Fewer than 52 Weeks 
Female  n.a.  0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.06 
Male  n.a.  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Notes: 
Individuals who do not work at all in a given year are excluded from those “working part-time” and “working fewer than 52 weeks” and are 
included as zeros in the definition of “working full-time/full-year.” 9/22/2009 Dynamics  28
Table 2  
Earnings Trajectories (in 2006 dollars) by Years since MBA Graduation and Starting Job Function 
 
 
Number of 
years since 
graduation: 
Females Males   Females  Males    All  Survey 
Respondents 
  Start in Consulting    Start in I-Banking 
Mean Mean    Median  Median    Mean  Median  Mean Median   Mean Median 
(1)  (2)   (3)  (4)   (5)  (6)   (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
0  114,928 130,156   105,882 125,000   126,356  122,076   129,623 129,032  173,740 160,612 
1  130,321 162,785   113,404 136,520   154,691  129,032   143,649 140,307  248,639 232,411 
2  146,616 196,208   121,184 146,237   184,111  139,516   159,823 151,261  306,221 280,156 
3  163,835 227,143   125,000 154,601   212,043  146,342   176,254 154,601  352,911 314,019 
4  182,103 258,785   129,412 169,657   240,861  154,601   196,798 160,085  410,985 332,016 
5  204,702 294,934   136,957 180,645   274,186  168,093   221,059 170,311  470,608 369,076 
6  230,084 330,114   143,874 196,109   307,451  175,000   246,169 180,645  500,979 380,645 
7  235,733 359,822   146,342 204,878   332,762  186,766   263,166 196,109  565,927 398,419 
8  242,528 391,075   151,261 204,878   357,991  191,739   288,272 191,739  635,775 434,572 
9  252,421 400,488   148,432 211,573   367,601  186,766   299,331 196,109  691,156 468,120 
10 or more  243,481 442,353   146,342 242,367   400,715  217,121   362,274 238,710  815,914 559,802 
 
Notes:  
Cols. (1) to (4): Mean and median annual earnings by number of years since graduation for males and females.  Cols. (5) and (6): 
Mean and median annual earnings by number of years since graduation across all survey respondents.  Remaining columns give 
means and medians for survey respondents whose first post-MBA job function was consulting (cols. 7 and 8) or investment banking 
(cols. 9 and 10).  The existence of duplicate numbers (e.g., 204,878) is because these are medians in 2006 dollars. 
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Table 3  
Gender Gap in Earnings and Labor Supply 
 
 
Number of 
years since 
receipt of 
MBA 
Annual 
earnings 
Log (annual 
earnings) 
Log (annual 
earnings) 
first year in 
job 
Cumulative 
years not 
working 
Not working 
at all in 
current year 
Annual weeks 
worked in 
current year 
a 
Annual hours 
worked in 
current year 
a 
Log (weekly 
hours 
worked) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0  -16,943 -0.113  -0.110  -0.001  0.024  -1.628 -181.94 -0.034 
  [2,223]* [0.018]* [0.018]* [0.000]§ [0.009]§ [0.530]* [46.71]* [0.012]* 
1  -31,083 -0.17 -0.174 0.022 0.006 -0.907  -111.71  -0.036 
  [3,999]* [0.022]* [0.050]* [0.008]*  [0.004]  [0.357]§ [39.74]* [0.012]* 
2  -49,976  -0.216 -0.270 0.038 0.014 -1.744  -210.59  -0.060 
  [7,072]* [0.027]* [0.056]* [0.012]* [0.005]§ [0.423]* [41.76]* [0.013]* 
3  -65,799  -0.260 -0.189 0.070 0.023 -2.059  -260.89  -0.074 
  [9,238]* [0.033]* [0.075]§ [0.017]* [0.007]* [0.512]* [45.99]* [0.015]* 
4  -78,198  -0.284 -0.314 0.099 0.027 -2.427  -297.42  -0.088 
  [11,334]*  [0.036]* [0.067]* [0.023]* [0.009]* [0.559]* [49.04]* [0.016]* 
5  -90,252  -0.311 -0.198 0.154 0.046 -3.426  -337.65 -0.09 
  [15,011]*  [0.042]* [0.081]§ [0.031]* [0.011]* [0.695]* [52.63]* [0.017]* 
6  -97,662  -0.320 -0.272 0.212 0.059 -4.665  -363.46  -0.083 
  [21,093]*  [0.048]* [0.125]§ [0.041]* [0.013]* [0.812]* [61.16]* [0.019]* 
7  -123,253  -0.352 -0.119 0.294 0.077 -5.101  -438.56  -0.094 
  [24,038]*  [0.053]* [0.105] [0.052]*  [0.016]*  [0.891]*  [63.70]*  [0.021]* 
8  -149,901  -0.375 -0.476 0.342 0.082 -6.152  -487.39  -0.097 
  [27,328]*  [0.057]* [0.121]* [0.062]* [0.017]* [0.976]* [66.86]* [0.019]* 
9  -152,002  -0.402 -0.360 0.476 0.116 -7.029  -622.55  -0.138 
  [31,672]*  [0.066]* [0.170]§ [0.079]* [0.021]* [1.136]* [77.33]* [0.026]* 
≥  10  -195,576  -0.583 -0.604 0.925 0.155 -8.812  -789.90  -0.195 
  [40,295]*  [0.084]* [0.112]* [0.143]* [0.025]* [1.345]* [96.23]* [0.035]* 
Cohort  ×  year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  20,161 20,161  5,220  21,290 21,290 21,286 20,925 20,430 
R-squared  0.11 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 
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Notes: The unit of observation is a survey respondent in a given post-MBA year.  Each column 
corresponds to a different regression and each includes (cohort × year) dummies and interactions 
between a female dummy and dummy variables for the number of years since receipt of the 
MBA.  The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms between the female 
dummy and years since receiving the MBA.  “Annual earnings” is defined as total earnings 
before taxes and other deductions, including salary and bonus, and is coded as missing when the 
individual is not working.  “Hourly wage” is computed by dividing annual earnings by (weekly 
hours worked × 52).  Col. (3) includes only the first year at a given job.  Standard errors (in 
brackets) are clustered at the individual level; § significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 9/22/2009 Dynamics  31
Table 4  
Determinants of the Gender Gap in Labor Supply: The Role of Children 
 
Dependent Variable  Not working Actual  post-MBA 
experience 
  Log (weekly hours 
worked) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female  0.084  -0.286  -0.089  
  [0.009]*  [0.039]*  [0.013]*  
Female with child   0.200  -0.660  -0.238 
   [0.024]*  [0.094]*  [0.031]* 
Female without child   0.034  -0.126  -0.033 
   [0.007]*  [0.031]*  [0.012]* 
        
Pre-MBA characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MBA performance  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort × year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -0.175  -0.111 5.929 5.757 3.951 3.914 
  [0.145]  [0.126]  [0.618]* [0.550]* [0.462]* [0.426]* 
Observations  19,366 19,286 19,366 19,286 18,611 18,535 
R-squared  0.07 0.11 0.98 0.98 0.14 0.16 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a survey respondent in a given post-MBA year.  “Female with 
child” (“Female without child”) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent is a female 
and has at least one child (no child) in that year.  Pre-MBA characteristics include: a dummy for 
U.S. citizen, a White dummy, an Asian dummy, a dummy for “top 10” undergraduate institution, 
a dummy for “top 10-20” undergraduate institution, undergraduate GPA, a dummy for missing 
undergraduate GPA, a quadratic in age, verbal GMAT score, quantitative GMAT score, a 
dummy for pre-MBA industry and a dummy for pre-MBA job function.  MBA performance 
includes overall MBA GPA and fraction of finance classes.  Standard errors (in brackets) are 
clustered at the individual level; *  significant  at  1%.        
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Table 5  
Female Labor Supply and Spousal Income 
 
   Not working  Actual post-MBA 
experience 
Log (weekly hours 
worked) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Female with child  0.119 -0.420  -0.169 
  [0.046]* [0.175]§ [0.041]* 
Female with child × spouse with 
high earnings 
0.185 -0.538  -0.189 
[0.061]* [0.240]§ [0.078]§ 
Female with child × spouse with 
medium earnings 
0.026 -0.148  -0.045 
[0.059] [0.235]  [0.063] 
Female without child  0.047 -0.162  -0.067 
  [0.021]§ [0.087]  [0.025]* 
Female without child × spouse 
with high earnings 
-0.028 0.122  0.100 
[0.023] [0.088]  [0.034]* 
Female without child × spouse 
with medium earnings 
-0.011 0.100  -0.008 
[0.023] [0.086]  [0.030] 
Pre-MBA characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes 
MBA performance  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Spouse salary dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Cohort × year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -0.138 5.795  3.891 
  [0.119] [0.520]*  [0.426]* 
Observations  17,655 17,655  17,010 
R-squared  0.14 0.99  0.18 
Notes: The unit of observation is a survey respondent in a given post-MBA year.  The sample 
includes only women who were married or living with someone at the survey date and also 
dropped women with missing information on spousal income; men are included regardless of 
marital status. “Female with child” (“without child”) is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
respondent is a female and has at least one child (no child) in that year.  “Spouse with high 
earnings” is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent reports that his/her spouse or 
significant other earns at least $200,000 in the survey year, 0 otherwise.  “Spouse with medium 
earnings” is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent reports that his/her spouse or 
significant other earns at least $100,000 and at most $200,000 in the survey year, 0 if the 
respondent reports that his/her spouse or significant other earns at most $100,000 or at least 
$200,000 in the survey year.  Pre-MBA characteristics include: a dummy for US citizen, a White 
dummy, an Asian dummy, a dummy for “top 10” undergraduate institution, a dummy for “top 10 
to 20” undergraduate institution, undergraduate GPA, a dummy for missing undergraduate GPA, 
a quadratic in age, verbal GMAT score, quantitative GMAT score, a dummy for pre-MBA 
industry and a dummy for pre-MBA job function.  MBA performance includes overall MBA 
GPA and fraction of finance classes.  Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the individual 
level; § significant at 5%; * significant at 1%.9/22/2009 Dynamics  33
Table 6  
Wage Regressions 
 
  Dependent Variable: Log (Annual Earnings) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Female  -0.287 -0.190 -0.146 -0.173 -0.094 -0.064 -0.054 -0.045 -0.038 
  [0.035]* [0.033]* [0.032]* [0.030]* [0.029]* [0.029]§  [0.028] [0.026] [0.025] 
MBA GPA    0.429 0.406    0.369 0.351 0.367 0.341 0.347 
    [0.054]* [0.053]*    [0.051]* [0.051]* [0.049]* [0.044]* [0.043]* 
Fraction finance classes   1.833  1.807  1.758  1.737  1.65  0.464  0.430 
   [0.211]*  [0.206]*  [0.199]*  [0.194]*  [0.193]*  [0.181]§ [0.180]§ 
Actual  post-MBA  exp     0.046    0.085  0.056  0.044  0.029 
      [0.075]      [0.071] [0.068] [0.066] [0.064] 
Actual post-MBA exp
2     0.010    0.005  0.008  0.006  0.007 
     [0.004]*     [0.004]  [0.003]§  [0.003]  [0.003]§ 
Any no work spell     -0.290    -0.228  -0.218  -0.181  -0.173 
     [0.067]*    [0.062]*  [0.061]*  [0.056]*  [0.054]* 
           
D u m m y   v a r i a b l e s :            
    Weekly  hours  worked    No  No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    Pre-MBA  characteristics  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Reason for choosing job  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
    Job  function    No No No No No No No Yes  Yes 
    Employer  type    No No No No No No No Yes  Yes 
  Cohort × year  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Constant  12.156  9.493 8.809  10.385 8.08  7.525 8.229 7.744 8.324 
  [0.018]* [0.585]* [0.667]* [0.151]* [0.603]* [0.694]* [0.733]* [0.521]* [0.547]* 
Observations  18,272 18,272 18,272 18,272 18,272 18,272 18,272 18,272 18,272 
R-squared  0.15 0.31 0.34 0.26 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.53 0.54 
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Notes:  The unit of observation is a survey respondent in a given post-MBA year.  The results are 
robust to limiting the sample to only survey respondents with non-missing pre-MBA 
characteristics.  Pre-MBA characteristics include: a dummy for U.S. citizen, a “white” dummy, 
an Asian dummy, a dummy for “top 10” undergraduate institution, a dummy for “top 10 to 20” 
undergraduate institution, undergraduate GPA, a dummy for missing undergraduate GPA, a 
quadratic in age, verbal GMAT score, quantitative GMAT score, a dummy for pre-MBA 
industry and a dummy for pre-MBA job function.  “Any no work spell” is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for a given individual in a given year if the individual experiences a period of at least 
six months without work between MBA graduation and that year.  “Weekly hours worked” 
dummies include: < 20 hours, 20 to 29, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, 50 to 59, 60 to 69, 70 to 79, 80 to 89, 
90 to 99, and ≥ 100 hours.  “Reason for choosing job” dummies include: Compensation and 
other benefits; Career advancement or broadening; Prestige; Culture/people/environment; 
Flexible hours; Reasonable total hours per week; Limited travel schedule; Opportunity to work 
remotely; Location; Other.  “Employer type” dummies include: Public for-profit, < 100 
employees; Public for-profit, 100 to 1,000 employees; Public for-profit, 1,000 to 15,000 
employees; Public for-profit, > 15,000 employees; Private for-profit, < 100 employees; Private 
for-profit, 101 to 1,000 employees; Private for-profit, 1,000 to 15,000 employees; Private for-
profit, > 15,000 employees; Not-for-profit; Other.  Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at 
the individual level; § significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 9/22/2009 Dynamics  35
Table 7  
Gender Wage Gap by Years since MBA 
 
  Number of Years since MBA Receipt 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  ≥ 10 
1. With no 
controls 
-0.089 -0.154 -0.213 -0.253 -0.274 -0.299 -0.308 -0.331 -0.358 -0.376 -0.565 
[0.020]* [0.025]* [0.032]* [0.038]* [0.043]* [0.048]* [0.056]* [0.062]* [0.069]* [0.079]* [0.045]* 
             
With  controls:             
2. Pre-MBA 
characteristics 
-0.080 -0.136 -0.172 -0.204 -0.221 -0.257 -0.248 -0.271 -0.296 -0.320 -0.479 
[0.021]* [0.026]* [0.033]* [0.039]* [0.044]* [0.049]* [0.057]* [0.065]* [0.072]* [0.084]* [0.045]* 
             
3. Add MBA 
performance 
-0.054 -0.103 -0.129 -0.154 -0.166 -0.189 -0.180 -0.200 -0.234 -0.257 -0.446 
[0.021]* [0.025]* [0.032]* [0.037]* [0.042]* [0.047]* [0.055]* [0.063]* [0.070]* [0.082]* [0.044]* 
           
4. Add labor 
market exp. 
-0.053 -0.093 -0.118 -0.134 -0.147 -0.171 -0.143 -0.141 -0.164 -0.181 -0.312 
[0.021]§ [0.025]* [0.031]* [0.037]* [0.042]* [0.047]* [0.055]* [0.063]§ [0.070]§ [0.082]§ [0.044]* 
             
5. Add weekly 
hours worked  
-0.036 -0.073 -0.069 -0.073 -0.079 -0.090 -0.079 -0.054 -0.085 -0.047 -0.098 
[0.020] [0.023]*  [0.030]§  [0.036]§ [0.041] [0.045]§ [0.053]  [0.060]  [0.067]  [0.078] [0.042]§ 
             
6. Add reason for 
choosing job 
-0.033 -0.067 -0.058 -0.064 -0.073 -0.089 -0.075 -0.052 -0.086 -0.031 -0.066 
[0.020]  [0.023]*  [0.030]§  [0.035] [0.040]  [0.045]§  [0.053] [0.060] [0.067] [0.079] [0.042] 
             
7. Add job setting 
characteristics 
-0.025 -0.060 -0.051 -0.064 -0.046 -0.065 -0.080 -0.070 -0.052 0.002 -0.010 
[0.019] [0.022]* [0.027] [0.032]§ [0.037]  [0.041]  [0.048]  [0.054]  [0.060]  [0.071]  [0.037] 
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Notes: The dependent variable in each equation is log (annual earnings).  Each cell corresponds 
to a different regression.  The unit of observation is a survey respondent in a given post-MBA 
year.  In the regression without any controls, the sample is restricted to those survey respondents 
with non-missing pre-MBA characteristics.  All regressions include (cohort × year) dummies and 
a female dummy.  In each column, the sample is restricted to (individual × year) observations 
that correspond to the number of years since graduation listed in that column.  Each cell gives the 
estimated coefficient on the female dummy.  The controls for Pre-MBA characteristics, Weekly 
Hours Worked, and Reason for Choosing a Job are the same as those described in the notes to 
Table 6.  MBA performance includes overall MBA GPA and fraction of finance classes.  Labor 
market experience includes a quadratic in actual experience since MBA graduation, a dummy 
variable for “any no work spell” and dummy variables for weekly hours worked.  Job setting 
characteristics include job function dummies and “Employer type” dummies. “Employer type” 
dummies include: Public for-profit, < 100 employees; Public for-profit, 100 to 1,000 employees; 
Public for-profit, 1,000 to 15,000 employees; Public for-profit, > 15,000 employees; Private for-
profit, < 100 employees; Private for-profit, 101 to 1,000 employees; Private for-profit, 1,000 to 
15,000 employees; Private for-profit, > 15,000 employees; Not-for-profit; Other.  Standard errors 
are in brackets; § significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 9/22/2009 Dynamics  37
Table 8: Who gets married? Who has kids? 
 
  Dependent Variable: Predicted Log (Annual Earnings) 
 (1)    (2)    (3) 
Female, married  -0.066 
[0.025]* 
     
Female, unmarried  -0.084 
[0.029]* 
     
Male, married  0.052 
[0.020]* 
     
Female with spouse as or more educated      -0.110 
[0.024]* 
  
Female with spouse less educated      -0.127 
[0.038]* 
  
Male with spouse as or more educated      0.006 
[0.017] 
  
Female with child          -0.073 
[0.025]* 
Female without child          -0.088 
[0.022]* 
Male with child          0.056 
[0.016]* 
Constant -0.061 
[0.018]* 
 -0.013 
[0.014] 
 -0.053 
[0.012]* 
Observations 2,317    1,764    2,310 
R-squared 0.02    0.02    0.03 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a survey respondent.  Each column corresponds to a different regression.  
The sample in column (2) is restricted to respondents who were married at the time of the survey.  The 
dependent variable in all regressions is predicted log (annual earnings) constructed as follows.  In the 
sample of male respondents, log (annual earnings) at the individual × year level is regressed on cohort × 
year dummies.  The residual from that regression is then regressed on pre-MBA characteristics and MBA 
performance.  Predicted log (annual earnings) is the predicted value from that second regression.  The 
controls for pre-MBA characteristics are the same as those described in the notes to Table 6.  MBA 
performance includes overall MBA GPA and fraction of finance classes. “Female, married” (“Male, 
married”) is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is female (male) and married or living 
with a significant other at the time of the survey.  “Female, unmarried” is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the respondent is female and is neither married nor living with a significant other at the time of the 
survey.  “Female with spouse as or more educated” (“Male with spouse as or more educated”) is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is a female (male) living with someone that holds 
strictly more than a college degree.  “Female with less educated spouse” is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the respondent is a female living with someone that holds at most a college degree.  “Female with 
child” (“Male with child”) is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is a female (male) who 
reports having at least one child at the time of the survey.  “Female without child” is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the respondent is a female who reports being without child at the time of survey.  
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Table 9 
Impact of First Birth on Employment Status, Salary, and Working Hours 
 
  Not Working  Log (Annual 
Earnings) 
Annual Earnings 
(conditional on 
working) 
Annual Earnings     
(0 if not working) 
Log(Weekly Hours 
Worked) 
Log 
(Annual 
Earnings) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
 Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female Male  Female  Male  Female  Female 
Year of birth of 
first  child  -0.001 0.096  0.008 -0.096 1,880 -32,690  -2,315  -45,666  -0.006  -0.126 0.016 
  [0.007] [0.032]* [0.036]  [0.054] [21,228] [21,003]  [20,942]  [20,936]§  [0.010] [0.029]*  [0.049] 
Years after birth 
of first child:                       
1 or 2  -0.009 0.131  0.040 -0.164 7,817 -41,129  5,117 -64586 -0.013  -0.168 -0.008 
  [0.007] [0.036]* [0.040]   [0.066]§  [24,606] [27,000]    [24,118]  [26,335]§  [0.011] [0.036]*  [0.060] 
3 or 4  -0.007 0.178  0.065 -0.292 14,701  -60,050  9,721 -99,397  -0.011  -0.238 -0.069 
  [0.008] [0.045]* [0.049] [0.092]* [30,833] [36,118]    [29,915]  [34,839]* [0.013]  [0.049]* [0.079] 
5 or more  0.000 0.190 0.162 -0.301  69,385  -63,664  62,581  -101,719  0.000  -0.233 -0.079 
  [0.0012]  [0.054]* [0.060]§ [0.119]§  [39,072] [50,035]    [37,872]  [44,384]§  [0.017] [0.071]*  [0.097] 
Years before birth 
of first child: 
               
1 or 2  -0.006 -0.015 -0.008 -0.051 -5,740 -21,501  -7,830 -19,137 -0.005  -0.043 -0.016 
  [0.005] [0.021] [0.030] [0.041] [16,341]  [14,794]  [16,303]  [15,226] [0.009]  [0.023] [0.037] 
                 
Observations  14,490  5,070 13,969 4,545 13,969 4,545  14,523 5,070 14,193  4,560  4,523 
R-squared  0.29  0.46 0.77 0.73 0.68 0.72  0.66 0.68 0.72  0.68 0.79 
 
Notes:  The unit of observation is a survey respondent in a given post-MBA year.  Individuals who had children prior to completing 
their MBA are not included in the regressions.  Each column corresponds to a different regression. All regressions include (cohort × 
year) dummies, person fixed effects and a quadratic in age.  Each row reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating the year 
of first birth or the number of years after or before the birth of the first child.  Col. (11) also includes a vector of dummy variables to 
control for hours worked (i.e., < 20 hours, 20-29, 30-39, … , 90-99, and ≥100 hours).  Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the 
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Table 10  
Impact of Birth of First Child on Female Employment Status, Salary, and Working Hours: by Spouse’s Income Level in 2006 
 
  Spouse Earns at Most $200K in 2006    Spouse Earns More than $200K in 2006 
 
Not 
Working 
Log 
(annual 
earnings) 
Annual 
earnings 
(condition-
al on 
working) 
Log 
(weekly 
hours 
worked) 
Annual 
earnings 
(0 if not 
working)  
Not 
Working 
Log 
(annual 
earnings) 
Annual 
earnings 
(condition-
al on 
working) 
Log 
(weekly 
hours 
worked) 
Annual 
earnings 
(0 if not 
working) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)    (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Year of birth 
of first child  0.006  -0.003  -18,220  -0.141  -9,659    0.170  -0.043  -63,146  -0.088  -89,785 
  [0.040] [0.089] [23,492] [0.046]* [23,599]    [0.070]§  [0.099] [64,143] [0.060] [62,741] 
Years after 
birth of first 
child: 
                
1 or 2  0.003  -0.040  -22,952  -0.162  -10,100    0.224  -0.120  -84,144  -0.158  -128,393 
  [0.047] [0.102] [28,570] [0.054]* [28,203]    [0.081]*  [0.124]  [79,826] [0.077]§  [78,332] 
3 or 4  0.025  -0.100  -23,451  -0.238  -13,151    0.281  -0.264  -128,180  -0.206  -198,134 
  [0.064] [0.142] [41,993] [0.071]* [38,170]    [0.096]*  [0.180] [109,853] [0.105] [105,466] 
5 or more  0.013  0.069  -1,425  -0.234  3,236    0.315  -0.382  -135,986  -0.194  -216,101 
 [0.087]  [0.192]  [56,470]  [0.099]§  [49,555]    [0.107]*  [0.233] [136,768] [0.153] [123,738] 
Years before 
birth of first 
c h i l d :                   
1 or 2  -0.066  -0.047  -19,397  -0.082  -1,574    0.018  0.078  -25,788  0.043  -38,502 
  [0.030]§  [0.068] [16,397] [0.036]§  [16,604]    [0.044]  [0.074] [37,108] [0.048] [42,786] 
Observations  1,841  1,674  1,674 1,672  1,841    1,422 1,198 1,198 1,190 1,422 
R-squared 0.50  0.69 0.69 0.66 0.64    0.53  0.82  0.79  0.77  0.74 
 
Notes:  The unit of observation is a female survey respondent in a given post-MBA year.  The sample includes those who were married at the 
survey date and excludes those who had children prior to completing their MBA.  Each column corresponds to a different regression.  All 
regressions include (cohort × year) dummies, person fixed effects and a quadratic in age.  Each row reports the coefficient on a dummy variable 
indicating the year of first birth or the number of years after or before the birth of the first child.  Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the 
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Table 11 
Impact of Birth of First Child on Women’s Reasons for Not Working, Choosing or Leaving a Job, and Job Characteristics 
 
  Not Working: 
Reasons 
Choosing Job: 
Reasons 
Leave Job Leave Job: Reasons  Characteristics of Current Job 
Function 
  Family Career Family Career    Family Career  Career2 Mean 
hours 
Fraction ≤ 
[30-40] 
hours 
Fraction 
≤ [40-50] 
hours 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) 
Year of birth of 
first  child  0.119 -0.011 0.125 -0.080 -0.014 0.039 -0.014 -0.019  -0.018 -0.003  -0.019 
  [0.030]*  [0.008]  [0.032]*  [0.041] [0.035] [0.022] [0.014] [0.021] [0.420] [0.004]  [0.013] 
Years after birth 
of first child: 
            
  1 or 2  0.152 -0.008 0.197 -0.132 -0.007 0.028 -0.019 -0.017 0.156 -0.004  -0.033 
  [0.034]* [0.010] [0.040]*  [0.051]* [0.031]  [0.017]  [0.013]  [0.019] [0.491]  [0.005]  [0.016]§ 
  3 or 4  0.200 -0.009 0.256 -0.214 -0.043 0.035 -0.009 -0.017 0.552 -0.008  -0.053 
  [0.042]* [0.013] [0.050]*  [0.061]* [0.034]  [0.018]  [0.016]  [0.022] [0.618]  [0.006]  [0.020]* 
  5 or more  0.233 -0.018 0.231 -0.135 -0.065 0.005 0.000 -0.007 1.068 -0.012  -0.066 
  [0.050]*  [0.014]  [0.062]*  [0.074] [0.038] [0.019] [0.019] [0.025] [0.770] [0.007]  [0.026]§ 
Years before birth 
of first child: 
            
  1 or 2  -0.006 -0.004 0.040 -0.040 0.003 0.059 -0.014 -0.040  -0.483 0.004  0.014 
  [0.016]  [0.008]  [0.022]  [0.032]  [0.027] [0.017]* [0.013] [0.018]* [0.351]  [0.003]  [0.010] 
Reason for 
choosing job 
dummies 
No   No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Observations  5,070 5,070 4,577 4,577 5,070 5,070 5,070 5,070 5,070 5,070  5,070 
R-squared  0.49 0.38 0.61 0.68 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.69 0.57  0.57 9/22/2009 Dynamics  41
Notes: Unit of observation is a female survey respondent in a given post-MBA year.  Individuals 
who had children prior to completing their MBA are not included in the regressions.  Each 
column corresponds to a different regression.  All regressions include cohort × year fixed effects, 
person fixed effects and a quadratic in age.  Also included in columns (5) to (8) are dummies for 
the reasons for choosing current job.  Each row reports the coefficient on a dummy variable 
indicating the year of first birth or the stated number of years after or before the birth of the first 
child.  “Not Working: Reasons – Family (Career)” is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
respondent reports not working in that year and the reason for not working is family (career) 
related.  Family reasons include: “Do not need or want to work”; “Home taking care of parents 
or other relatives” and “Home raising children.”  Career reasons include: “Layoff” and “Suitable 
job not available.”  “Choosing Job: Reasons – Family (Career)” is a dummy that equals one if the 
respondent reports family-related (career-related) reasons for choosing the job she/he is holding 
in that year.  Family reasons include: “Flexible hours”; “Opportunity to work remotely”; 
“Limited travel schedule.” Career reasons include: “Career advancement or broadening”; 
“Compensation and other benefits” and “Prestige.”  “Leave Job” is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the respondent reports leaving a job in that year.  “Leave Job: Reasons – Family (Career)” 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent reports leaving a job in that year and 
indicates family-related (career) reasons for leaving.  Family reasons include:  “Family reasons” 
and “Lifestyle (long hours, inflexible hours, extended travel schedule, etc).”  Career reasons 
include: “Limited scope for career advancement and broadening” and “Limited scope for future 
earnings gain.”  Career2 reasons also include: “Job did not match my strengths and interests” and 
“Issues with culture/people/environment.”    “Fraction ≤ [30-40] hours” is the fraction of 
individual × year observations in that job function where hours worked are below 20, between 20 
and 30, or between 30 and 40.”  “Fraction ≤ [40-50] hours” is the fraction of individual × year 
observations in that job function where hours worked are below 20, between 20 and 30, between 
30 and 40 or between 40 and 50.  See Appendix A2 for more details.  Standard errors (in 
brackets) are clustered at the individual level; § significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 9/22/2009 Dynamics  42
Appendix Table A1  
Who Responded to the Survey 
 
   MBA Classes 1990 to 2006 
a
Respondent Non-respondent 
b p-value 
Sample size  2,485  6,636   
Fraction female  0.25  0.23  0.063 
Fraction US citizen  0.78  0.72  0.000 
Fraction White  0.64  0.59  0.000 
Fraction Asian  0.13  0.16  0.000 
Age at entry  27.57  27.62  0.525 
Top 10 undergraduate 
institution  
0.13 0.13  0.880 
Top 10 to 20 undergraduate 
institution 
0.10 0.09  0.097 
Undergrad GPA  2.68  2.65  0.456 
Undergrad GPA (missing)  0.19  0.20  0.357 
Total GMAT  668  655  0.000 
Quantitative  GMAT  43.31 42.79 0.000 
Verbal  GMAT  38.65 37.43 0.000 
MBA GPA  3.35  3.31  0.000 
Fraction finance classes  0.17  0.19  0.000 
 
a Includes only those who were matched to University of Chicago Booth School of Business 
administrative records (355 could not be matched). 
b “Non-respondent” also includes several hundred individuals who could not be contacted by e-
mail. 
 
Notes:       
The unit of observation is an individual.  The table compares mean pre-MBA characteristics and 
MBA performance between survey respondents and non-respondents. The last column reports a 
p-value on a test of comparison of means between the two groups.  The top ten undergraduate 
institutions are Caltech, Columbia, Duke, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford, University of 
Chicago, University of Pennsylvania, and Yale; the top 20 undergraduate institutions add to this 
group: Brown, Cornell, Dartmouth, Emory, Johns Hopkins, Northwestern, Rice, University of 
Notre Dame, Vanderbilt, and Washington University (Source: US News and World Report 2008, 
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/usnews/edu/college/rankings/brief/t1natudoc_bri
ef.php) .  The Quantitative and Verbal GMAT scores are out of a total of 60; the Total GMAT 
score averages the percentage rankings of the two components and scales the average out of a 
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Appendix Table A2  
Gender Differences in Background, Test Scores, MBA Course Selection, and MBA Grades 
 
  All 1990-2006 Graduates    Survey Respondents 
Females Males p-value  Females Males p-value 
 (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
Sample size  2,185  6,936      629  1,856   
              
U.S. citizen  0.78  0.72  0.000    0.83  0.77  0.001 
White 0.58  0.61  0.026    0.66  0.63  0.129 
Asian 0.19  0.14  0.000    0.15  0.12  0.059 
Age at entry  27.05  27.78  0.000    26.96  27.78  0.000 
Top 10 undergraduate 
institution 
0.14 0.12  0.062    0.15 0.12  0.091 
Top 10 to 20 undergraduate 
institution 
0.09 0.09  0.665    0.10 0.10  0.939 
Undergrad GPA  2.79  2.62  0.000    2.87  2.61  0.000 
Undergrad GPA (missing)  0.17  0.21  0.000    0.21  0.14  0.000 
Total GMAT  642  664  0.000    654  673  0.000 
Quantitative GMAT  41.14  43.49  0.000    41.77  43.81  0.000 
Verbal GMAT  37.23  37.94  0.000    38.26  38.78  0.035 
MBA GPA  3.23  3.34  0.000    3.25  3.38  0.000 
              
Fraction MBA classes in:               
 Finance  0.16  0.19  0.000    0.15  0.18  0.000 
 Accounting  0.13  0.15  0.000    0.13  0.14  0.003 
 Economics  0.15  0.15  0.842    0.15  0.15  0.928 
 Marketing  0.12  0.09  0.000    0.12  0.09  0.000 
 Statistics  0.06  0.06  0.000    0.06  0.06  0.005 
 Entrepreneurship  0.02  0.03  0.000    0.03  0.04  0.030 
              
Average GPA in:               
 Finance  3.03  3.27  0.000    3.04  3.31  0.000 
 Accounting  3.09  3.29  0.000    3.13  3.33  0.000 
 Economics  3.14  3.30  0.000    3.14  3.33  0.000 
 Marketing  3.26  3.30  0.002    3.30  3.34  0.085 
 Statistics  3.22  3.38  0.000    3.23  3.38  0.000 
 Entrepreneurship  3.21  3.33  0.000    3.26  3.37  0.007 
 
Notes:  The unit of observation is an individual.  The table compares pre-MBA characteristics 
and MBA experience and performance between male and female individuals.  Cols. (1) to (3) 
include all individuals who graduated from the MBA program between 1990 and 2006; cols. (4) 
to (6) are for those who responded to the survey.  Cols. (3) and (6) report p-values of the test of 
equality of the means between females and males for each variable.  Information on the top 10 
and top 10 to 20 undergraduate institutions is given in the notes to Appendix Table A1. 9/22/2009 Dynamics  44
Appendix Table A3 
Career and Family Statistics 
 
   All  Male  Female 
Career variables:     
 First  job  post-MBA:       
  Consulting  0.26  0.27  0.25 
    (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.43) 
  Investment  banking  0.13  0.14  0.10 
    (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.29) 
  Investment  management  0.09  0.10  0.06 
    (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.23) 
  Fraction of post-MBA working years in:       
  Consulting  0.19  0.19  0.19 
    (0.33)  (0.34)  (0.33) 
  Investment  banking  0.10  0.11  0.07 
    (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.24) 
  Investment  management  0.11  0.12  0.07 
    (0.29)  (0.31)  (0.23) 
 Ever  entrepreneur  0.15  0.16  0.11 
    (0.36)  (0.37)  (0.32) 
  Ever not working  0.14  0.10  0.27 
    (0.35)  (0.30)  (0.45) 
  Fraction post-MBA years not working  0.03  0.02  0.07 
    (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.16) 
  Currently not working  0.05  0.02  0.11 
    (0.21)  (0.15)  (0.32) 
  Total years not working  0.24  0.11  0.62 
    (0.92)  (0.44)  (1.60) 
  Average length of a working stage (years)  3.41  3.54  3.03 
    (2.89)  (3.00)  (2.50) 
  Average weekly working hours  58.29  59.15  55.75 
    (12.42)  (12.06)  (13.11) 
  Mean post-MBA annual earnings ($2006)  228,236  249,938  164,417 
    (242,140) (259,786)  (164,879) 
Family variables:       
 Married  0.77  0.81  0.65 
   (0.42)  (0.39)  (0.48) 
  Spouse with lower education  0.35  0.38  0.22 
   (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.42) 
  Number of children   1.11  1.23  0.77 
   (1.18)  (1.21)  (1.03) 
  Fraction without children  0.44  0.40  0.58 
     (0.50)  (0.49)  (0.49) 
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Notes:  The unit of observation is a survey respondent.  “Ever not working” is defined as having 
spent a period of at least six months since MBA graduation without working.  “Annual earnings” 
is defined as total earnings, before taxes and other deductions, including salary and bonus.  
“Annual earnings” is missing when individual is not working.  “Hourly wage” is computed by 
dividing annual earnings by (weekly hours × 52).  All family variables are measured as of the 
year the survey was conducted.  Spouse with lower education is defined as a spouse with a BA 
degree, some college, a high school degree, or some high school. 9/22/2009 Dynamics  46
Appendix Table A4 
Hours Worked by Job Function 
 
Function Mean 
hours 
Mean 
hours 
(men only)
Fraction 
≤ [30-40] 
hours 
Fraction 
≤ [40-50] 
hours 
Fraction 
women 
Individual 
× year 
observa-
tions 
Accounting 52.1  51.4  0.06  0.55  0.24  161 
Administration 53.2  55.3  0.08  0.38  0.19  161 
Advertising 51.6  52.5  0.06  0.44  0.59  156 
Business Development  55.8  55.9  0.04  0.29  0.17  842 
Client Services  58.1  60.7  0.06  0.26  0.24  187 
Commercial Banking  55.8  56.2  0.07  0.27  0.17  323 
Company Finance  53.4  53.6  0.04  0.35  0.29  1693 
Consulting 60.7  61.6  0.03  0.15  0.23  3643 
Customer Relations  50.5  51.3  0.05  0.57  0.23  120 
General Management  57.0  57.4  0.03  0.26  0.14  1869 
Human Resources  51.0  56.4  0.16  0.40  0.71  126 
Investment Banking  73.6  73.1  0.01  0.05  0.15  1871 
Investment Management  57.8  58.7  0.03  0.24  0.15  2021 
Law 58.3  58.1  0.06  0.25  0.19  188 
Management 49.7  52.5  0.05  0.69  0.30  136 
Multiple 59.0  59.0  0.09  0.26  0.22  515 
Operations 50.8  51.0  0.11  0.48  0.13  227 
Product Management  52.9  54.0  0.04  0.37  0.42  383 
Project  Management 52.4  52.1 0.08 0.48  0.26 1639 
Real Estate  55.3  56.7  0.05  0.35  0.13  407 
Research 52.2  54.7  0.09  0.36  0.30  275 
Risk Management  54.5  54.0  0.01  0.25  0.14  265 
Sales 54.0  53.6  0.03  0.36  0.30  161 
Sales and Trading  59.3  58.1  0.02  0.16  0.18  491 
Strategic Planning  53.7  55.1  0.04  0.40  0.30  691 
Venture Capital  59.4  59.6  0.02  0.23  0.08  812 
Other 55.8  55.9  0.10  0.31  0.54  740 
 
Notes:  Job function categories are from the Business School Career Services Department.  The 
sample is restricted to those job functions where the number of (individual × year) observations 
is ≥ 100.  “Fraction ≤ [30-40] hours” is the fraction of (individual × year) observations where 
hours worked are: below 20, between 20 and 30, or between 30 and 40.  “Fraction ≤ [40-50] 
hours” is the fraction of (individual × year) observations where hours worked are: below 20, 
between 20 and 30, between 30 and 40 or between 40 and 50.  “Fraction women” is the fraction 
of (individual × year) observations where individual is a female. 9/22/2009 Dynamics  47
Table A5 
Hourly Wage Regressions 
 
  Dependent Variable: Log (Hourly Wage) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Female  -0.193 -0.148 -0.102 -0.068  -0.05  -0.038 -0.029 
  [0.030]§ [0.030]§ [0.029]§ [0.029]*  [0.028]  [0.025]  [0.025] 
MBA GPA      0.369 0.349 0.359 0.332 0.336 
      [0.051]§ [0.051]§ [0.050]§ [0.044]§ [0.044]§ 
Fraction finance classes      1.729 1.705  1.62  0.472 0.449 
      [0.198]§ [0.194]§ [0.193]§ [0.180]§ [0.179]* 
Actual  post-MBA  exp        0.091 0.069 0.059 0.049 
        [0.074] [0.071] [0.068] [0.066] 
Actual post-MBA exp
2        0.005 0.007 0.005 0.006 
        [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
Any no work spell        -0.216 -0.200 -0.158 -0.150 
        [0.065]§ [0.063]§ [0.056]§ [0.054]§ 
Dummy variables:         
  Pre-MBA characteristics  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Reason for choosing job  No No No No Yes No Yes 
  Job function   No No No No No Yes  Yes 
  Employer type   No No No No No Yes  Yes 
  Cohort × year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant  4.156 2.285 1.582 0.893 1.477 0.955 1.487 
  [0.017]§ [0.609]§ [0.603]§  [0.717]  [0.780]  [0.548]  [0.597]* 
Observations  18,272 18,272 18,272 18,272 18,272 18,272 18,272 
R-squared  0.18 0.28 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.47 0.48 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is a survey respondent in a given post-MBA year.  Hourly wage 
is defined as annual earnings divided by (52 × usual weekly hours worked).  Pre-MBA 
characteristics include: a dummy for U.S. citizen, a “white” dummy, an Asian dummy, a dummy 
for “top 10” undergraduate institution, a dummy for “top 10 to 20” undergraduate institution, 
undergraduate GPA, a dummy for missing undergraduate GPA, a quadratic in age, verbal GMAT 
score, quantitative GMAT score, a dummy for pre-MBA industry and a dummy for pre-MBA job 
function.  “Any no work spell” is a dummy variable that equals 1 for a given individual in a 
given year if the individual experiences a period of at least six months without work between 
MBA graduation and that year.  “Reason for choosing job” dummies include: Compensation and 
other benefits; Career advancement or broadening; Prestige; Culture/people/environment; 
Flexible hours; Reasonable total hours per week; Limited travel schedule; Opportunity to work 
remotely; Location; Other.  “Employer type” dummies include: Public for-profit, < 100 
employees; Public for-profit, 100 to 1,000 employees; Public for-profit, 1,000 to 15,000 
employees; Public for-profit, > 15,000 employees; Private for-profit, < 100 employees; Private 
for-profit, 101 to 1,000 employees; Private for-profit, 1,000 to 15,000 employees; Private for-
profit, > 15,000 employees; Not-for-profit; Other.  Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at 
the individual level; § significant at 5%;  *  significant  at  1%.      9/22/2009 Dynamics  48
Appendix Table A6 
Gender Wage Gap by Years since MBA, for Females without Career Interruptions versus All Males 
 
  Number of Years since MBA Receipt 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
1. With no 
controls 
-0.088 -0.162 -0.173 -0.218 -0.197 -0.229 -0.184 -0.208 -0.250 -0.288 -0.343 
[0.047]  [0.053]* [0.061]* [0.068]* [0.071]* [0.073]* [0.078]§ [0.083]§ [0.087]* [0.093]* [0.097]* 
             
With  controls:             
2. Pre-MBA 
characteristics 
-0.082 -0.122 -0.106 -0.146 -0.160 -0.203 -0.153 -0.159 -0.201 -0.247 -0.282 
[0.052] [0.059]§ [0.068] [0.074]§  [0.079]§  [0.081]§ [0.088]  [0.093] [0.097]§  [0.103]§  [0.106]* 
             
3. Add MBA 
performance 
-0.057 -0.082 -0.058 -0.088 -0.100 -0.140 -0.088 -0.092 -0.140 -0.176 -0.217 
[0.051] [0.057] [0.066] [0.071] [0.075] [0.076] [0.084] [0.089] [0.093] [0.099]  [0.103]§ 
           
4. Add labor 
market exp. 
-0.057 -0.102 -0.087 -0.113 -0.118 -0.155 -0.107 -0.124 -0.182 -0.214 -0.261 
[0.051] [0.057] [0.065] [0.070] [0.075]  [0.077]§  [0.084] [0.089] [0.093]  [0.099]§  [0.103]§ 
             
5. Add weekly 
hours worked  
-0.050 -0.093 -0.075 -0.084 -0.075 -0.102 -0.085 -0.056 -0.116 -0.107 -0.100 
[0.050] [0.055] [0.063] [0.068] [0.072] [0.075] [0.080] [0.084] [0.089] [0.095] [0.100] 
             
6. Add reason for 
choosing job 
-0.044 -0.082 -0.064 -0.084 -0.067 -0.102 -0.070 -0.046 -0.108 -0.099 -0.085 
[0.050] [0.056] [0.063] [0.068] [0.072] [0.076] [0.081] [0.084] [0.088] [0.095] [0.099] 
             
7. Add job setting 
characteristics 
-0.040 -0.073 -0.044 -0.095 -0.060 -0.076 -0.066 -0.079 -0.116 -0.089 -0.070 
[0.051] [0.055] [0.061] [0.066] [0.068] [0.071] [0.077] [0.080] [0.082] [0.089] [0.091] 
 
Notes: The sample is restricted to the first ten years out for individuals who graduated at least ten years before. We include only 
females without a career interruption ten years post-graduation.  See also notes to Table 7.  Standard errors are in brackets; § 
significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table A7 
Gender Wage Gap by Years since MBA, for Females without Children and without Career Interruptions versus All Males 
 
  Number of Years since MBA Receipt 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
1. With no 
controls 
-0.130 -0.210 -0.223 -0.221 -0.158 -0.198 -0.137 -0.194 -0.235 -0.237 -0.279 
[0.068] [0.078]*  [0.088]§  [0.097]§ [0.101]  [0.104]  [0.113]  [0.119]  [0.126]  [0.133] [0.138]§ 
             
With  controls:             
2. Pre-MBA 
characteristics 
-0.151 -0.194 -0.172 -0.130 -0.097 -0.139 -0.077 -0.113 -0.159 -0.153 -0.141 
[0.074]§  [0.087]§  [0.100] [0.107] [0.114] [0.116] [0.128] [0.136] [0.140] [0.148] [0.152] 
             
3. Add MBA 
performance 
-0.129 -0.163 -0.133 -0.084 -0.047 -0.090 -0.024 -0.059 -0.110 -0.094 -0.090 
[0.073] [0.084] [0.096] [0.102] [0.107] [0.109] [0.122] [0.130] [0.135] [0.143] [0.148] 
           
4. Add labor 
market exp. 
-0.129 -0.182 -0.161 -0.110 -0.067 -0.103 -0.040 -0.089 -0.156 -0.134 -0.136 
[0.073]  [0.083]§  [0.095] [0.101] [0.107] [0.109] [0.122] [0.129] [0.135] [0.142] [0.148] 
             
5. Add weekly 
hours worked  
-0.125 -0.173 -0.157 -0.082 -0.050 -0.089 -0.065 -0.124 -0.172 -0.147 -0.125 
[0.072]  [0.081]§  [0.093] [0.098] [0.103] [0.106] [0.117] [0.123] [0.128] [0.136] [0.143] 
             
6. Add reason for 
choosing job 
-0.109 -0.161 -0.149 -0.077 -0.046 -0.086 -0.049 -0.109 -0.154 -0.128 -0.103 
[0.071]  [0.081]§  [0.093] [0.098] [0.103] [0.108] [0.117] [0.123] [0.128] [0.136] [0.142] 
             
7. Add job setting 
characteristics 
-0.082 -0.153 -0.121 -0.072 -0.045 -0.047 -0.015 -0.103 -0.158 -0.112 -0.038 
[0.071] [0.079] [0.090] [0.096] [0.096] [0.100] [0.110] [0.114] [0.117] [0.126] [0.129] 
 
Notes: The sample is restricted to the first ten years out for individuals who graduated at least ten years before.  We include only 
females without children and without a career interruption ten years post-graduation.  See also notes to Table 7. 
Standard errors are in brackets; § significant at 5%; * significant at 1%.9/22/2009 Dynamics  50
Appendix Table A8 
Impact of Birth of First Child on Female Employment Status, Salary, and Working Hours: by Spouse’s Education Level 
 
  Spouse Is Less Educated    Spouse Is As Or More Educated 
  Not 
Working 
Log 
(annual 
earnings) 
Annual 
earnings 
(condition-
al on 
working) 
Log 
(weekly 
hours 
worked) 
Annual 
earnings 
(0 if not 
working) 
 Not 
Working 
Log 
(annual 
earnings) 
Annual 
earnings 
(condition-
al on 
working) 
Log 
(weekly 
hours 
worked) 
Annual 
earnings 
(0 if not 
working) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)    (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Year of birth 
of first child  -0.086  -0.028  909  -0.158  27,227    0.145  -0.045  -51,531  -0.102  -72,015 
  [0.057] [0.134] [44,150] [0.049]*  [42,228]    [0.044]*  [0.070]  [36,032] [0.042]§ [34,016]§ 
Years after 
birth of first 
child: 
                
  1 or 2  -0.126  -0.012  896  -0.139 46,778    0.210  -0.107 -62,063 -0.171 -99,846 
  [0.063]§ [0.148]  [52,830]  [0.055]§ [48,058]   [0.051]*  [0.089]  [46,053]  [0.059]* [43,235]§ 
  3 or 4  -0.088 -0.098 -24,674  -0.226  6,971   0.260  -0.228  -85,510  -0.254 -136,980 
  [0.099] [0.200] [71,447] [0.063]*  [65,573]    [0.060]*  [0.122]  [62,895] [0.080]* [58,035]§ 
  5 or more  -0.179 -0.098 -67,470  -0.286 11,636   0.283  -0.189  -72,073  -0.258 -130,666 
  [0.132] [0.275] [98,356] [0.097]*  [88,582]    [0.065]*  [0.164]  [82,226] [0.116]§ [72,155] 
Years before 
birth of first 
child: 
                
  1 or 2  -0.095 0.074 11,955 -0.052 38,708    0.004  -0.040 -35,854 -0.028 -39,946 
  [0.038]§  [0.089]  [31,464] [0.036]  [32,009]    [0.029]  [0.053] [22,973] [0.034] [23,337] 
                  
Observations  881 814  814  808  881    2,625 2,281 2,281 2,276 2,625 
R-squared  0.46  0.8 0.77 0.75  0.69    0.51 0.74 0.76 0.71 0.72 
 
Notes:  The unit of observation is a female survey respondent in a given post-MBA year.  The sample includes those who were married at the 
survey date.  Each column corresponds to a different regression.  All regressions include (cohort × year) dummies, person fixed effects and a 
quadratic in age.  Each row reports the coefficient on a dummy variable indicating the year of first birth or the number of years after or before the 
birth of the first child.  Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the individual level; § significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
  9/22/2009 Dynamics  51
Appendix Table A9: Wage Changes Associated with Job Changes 
 Panel A: By Gender and Parental Status  Log (entry salary) in stage t – Log (end salary) in stage t-1 
 Mean  Median  25
th percentile  75
th percentile 
Overall -0.012  0.000  0.000  0.336 
Female: -0.028  0.000  -0.260  0.336 
With at least one child  -0.177  0.000  -0.357  0.336 
No children  0.019  0.000  0.000  0.336 
Male: -0.008  0.000  0.000  0.336 
With at least one child  -0.010 0.000  0.000  0.336 
No children  -0.004  0.000  0.000  0.336 
  
 Panel B: By Reason for Job Change  Log (entry salary) in stage t – Log (end salary) in stage t-1 
 
 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
Observations 
Reasons for choosing job in stage t:     
  Career advancement or broadening 0.04  0.61  1514 
  Compensation and other benefits  0.27  0.67  355 
 Culture/people/environment  -0.02  0.60  230 
 Flexible  hours  -0.64  0.85  67 
  Reasonable total hours per week  -0.21  0.60  83 
 Location  -0.09  0.49  135 
 Prestige  0.09  0.48  26 
  Opportunity to work remotely  -0.20  0.88  20 
  Limited travel schedule  -0.07  0.48  34 
 Other  -0.53  0.99  211 
 Missing  response  -0.23  0.40  3 
Reasons for leaving job in stage t-1:     
  Company was acquired  -0.23  0.83  164 
  Limited scope for career advancement 
and broadening 
0.07 0.64 617 
  Issues with culture/ people/ 
environment 
-0.08 0.69  244 
  Limited scope for future earnings gain  0.33  0.73  224 
 Family  reasons  -0.23  0.79  80 
 Involuntary  separation  -0.23  0.71  191 
 Lifestyle  -0.19  0.54  272 
  Medical or health reasons  -0.82  1.16  2 
  Company went out of business  0.05  0.78  134 
  Needed to relocate  0.07  0.44  145 
  Job did not match strengths and 
interests 
0.02 0.63 259 
 Other  0.01  0.69  333 
  Missing response   -0.30  0.78  13 9/22/2009 Dynamics  52
Notes:  The unit of observation is a working stage (stage t) that was immediately preceded by 
another working stage (stage t-1).  For each observation, we compute the difference between log 
(entry salary) in stage t and log (end salary) in stage t-1.  All salary figures are in 2006 dollars.  
In Panel A, observations are divided based on whether or not the individual had at least one child 
when stage t begins. In Panel B, observations are divided based on the reason for choosing job in 
stage t, or reason for leaving job in stage t-1.  
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Figure 1 
Male and Female Mean and Median Annual Salaries (2006 dollars) by Years since MBA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: See Table 1. 
 